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Abstract
1Prior to 1968, control of radiation-emitting electronic devices was left to state and
local governments, whose regulations proved both inconsistent and ineﬀective. This was
highlighted by General Electric’s 1967 recall of 90,000 television sets believed to emit dan-
gerous levels of radiation. Congress soon proposed a federal radiation control bill. The
hearings revealed the general lack of data on the harms of radiation exposure and the vast
amount of unnecessary radiation that Americans were exposed to each year. As enacted
on October 18, 1968, the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act authorized the Food
and Drug Administration to set federal radiation standards, to monitor compliance, and
to conduct research. The FDA’s Bureau of Radiological Health actively administered the
act. The act has produced safe electronic products, considerable scientiﬁc knowledge, and a
public well aware of the risks of radiation exposure. But for all of its successes, the act has
also had its problems. The act does not require pre-market approval, choosing instead to
respond once problems arise. The FDA has also seen signiﬁcant budget cuts and must pri-
oritize its obligations under all the acts it administers. The FDA has turned to the internet
to communicate its message to manufacturers and consumers, but at the same time must
counter the rise of the popular media and its ability to excite the public regarding potential
radiation hazards. How the FDA allocates its decreasing funds and works with the mass
media will determine the future of the act.
I. Introduction
A child swallows a penny, and his father can watch the penny move through the child’s body using a
2ﬂuoroscope.1 A person injures his leg, and his doctor can use an x-ray device to determine the extent of the
injury. A worker’s coﬀee is cold, and he can heat it quickly in a microwave. The twentieth century saw a
proliferation of new technology that had the potential to protect people’s health and to provide consumer
convenience and entertainment. The x-ray was discovered in 1895 by Wilhelm Roentgen.2 The x-ray’s
beneﬁts for medical diagnosis were discovered soon after. As the century progressed, consumer goods such
as color television sets provided in-home entertainment, while the microwave oven provided convenience to
an increasingly busy population. Tanned skin was becoming more popular, which resulted in the increased
use of sunlamps. These new and exciting products seemed to increase the overall quality of life. In 1967,
however, a General Electric (“GE”) recall of 90,000 television sets alerted Americans to the risks of using
these products.
GE discovered that its sets were emitting excessive radiation that had the potential to harm viewers who
sat near the sets. However, the radiation exceeded only voluntary industry-set standards, as there was no
federal regulation of radiation emitting products. State and local governments provided some regulation,
but it was both inconsistent and ineﬀective. Bills were introduced in both the House of Representatives and
the Senate in 1967 to enact a radiation control act. Congress quickly realized that the problem extended far
beyond color televisions. X-ray examinations represented ninety percent of human radiation exposure, and
the techniques and equipment were resulting in unnecessary exposure to both the patient and the physician.
Congress also realized that scientists knew very little about the dangers of radiation. Witnesses testiﬁed that
biological harm could be caused by much lower amounts of radiation as a result of a lifetime of exposure, and
that harm could result not just from ionizing radiation such as x-rays, but also from non-ionizing radiation
1Ricki Lewis, Radiation Continuing Concern With Fluoroscopy, FDA Consumer, Nov. 1993, at 18, 18.
2Egon Weck, A Primer on Medical Imaging – Part One, FDA Consumer, Apr. 1989, at 24, 24.
3such as microwaves and visible light. An accident in Pennsylvania during the legislative hearings prompted
passage of the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968 (“RCHSA”).
While the act was admittedly a compromise weakened by manufacturers’ lobbying eﬀorts, it still provided
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) with vast authority to conduct research, to set safety standards,
to monitor compliance, and to impose civil penalties. Research quickly led to technological advances in the
electronic devices themselves and contributed to a better understanding of the biological harms associated
with radiation exposure. The FDA also began a public education campaign to alert consumers to the
protective measures they should take in using certain electronic products. The primary focus of the act,
however, was the setting of enforceable radiation standards. The early standards revealed that measures
needed to produce safe electronic products were typically low cost and easy. In the absence of enforceable
standards, however, there had been little incentive to expend resources in this area.
The RCHSA’s early success is partially attributable to the cooperation between the Bureau of Radiological
Health and the manufacturers, and the commitment of federal resources to achieve the act’s goals. Both
factors are now declining. The FDA must now prioritize its activities under not just the RCHSA, but
related statutes such as the Medical Devices Amendments and the Mammography Quality Standards Act.
With the rapid development of technology, it is expected that new radiation-emitting products will be
produced. Should the FDA invest resources to determine the dangers of these products, or should it trust
professional organizations to set appropriate standards and instead devote its resources to monitoring and
enforcement? The FDA’s ability to spread its message on the internet quickly is countered by the rise of
a rather uninformed popular media more interested in ratings than science. The media has great power
to promote a single unsubstantiated study or freak accident and consequently the ability to undo years of
research and public education by the FDA. Well-considered collaboration with the popular media may be
the next logical step in ensuring a safe and knowledgeable citizenry.
4Not to be overlooked, however, is the fact that the problems facing the FDA regarding radiation exposure
are relatively mild when compared to the problems of the 1970’s and 1980’s. Radiation-emitting electronic
products that comply with federal standards are now safe, and concern has shifted to improper uses. While
the FDA may have more trouble detecting the rogue manufacturer trying to save a little money by producing
substandard products, many factors other than the chance of FDA detection strongly advise against short
cuts. Unlike the manufacturers in the 1970’s who had to conduct expensive research to produce safe products,
the technology is now well-developed and commonplace in the manufacturing of electronic products. The
RCHSA accomplished the goals set by Congress in 1968, and, consequently, today’s regulators are left with
a lesser burden. The FDA’s challenge will be with newer technology whose long-term eﬀects are not yet
known.
This paper discusses the progress of the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968. It begins with
an extensive discussion of the legislative history. A thorough understanding of the state of the law and of
science prior to the passage of the act is essential to evaluate properly the contributions the act has made.
It then discusses the major provisions of the act, the extent of the FDA’s authority, and the administrative
network in which it operates. This is followed by a discussion of the regulation of speciﬁc products, namely,
x-ray devices, microwaves, sunlamps, lasers, and cell phones. The history of the regulation of these products
further explains the FDA’s authority under the RCHSA. The ﬁnal section summarizes the contributions the
act has made to society by discussing the value of both the enforceable standards and the commitment to
public education. The RCHSA has resulted in products that are protective of human health and a public
that is aware of the dangers of excess radiation and is changing some of its behaviors accordingly.
II. The Road to Federal Radiation Control
5The Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act was enacted on October 18, 1968, as an amendment to the
Public Health Service Act “to provide for the protection of the public health from radiation emissions from
electronic products.”3 Prior to its enactment, radiation exposure had been regulated largely by the states4
based on recommendations from the Advisory Committee on X-Ray and Radiation Protection.5
High dose radiation had long been known to be fatal. Large-scale atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons
and the resulting radioactive fallout prompted the Eisenhower Administration to unify radiation control
activities in the Public Health Service in 19586 and to create the Federal Radiation Council in 1959.7 The
National Center for Radiological Health (“NCRH”) was established in 1967.8 However, as the nation entered
the “electronics age” and saw a “vast expansion in the number, diversity, and usefulness of electronic prod-
ucts,” the reliance on advisory committees and inconsistent state regulations proved insuﬃcient.9 Potentially
dangerous radiation was now known to emit not just from x-ray machines and nuclear weapons, but also
from standard consumer goods such as color televisions and microwave ovens.10 The need for uniform and
enforceable federal safety standards was clear.
A. The TV Debacle
3Pub. L. 90-602, 82 Stat. 1173 (1968).
4The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 gave the Atomic Energy Commission (“AEC”) authority to regulate certain artiﬁcial
radioactive materials, but its jurisdiction did not extend to consumer goods or medical devices. Alan R. Bennett & Robert
A. Dormer, FDA and Radiological Health: Protecting the Public From Radiation Hazards, in II Fundamentals of Law and
Regulation 299, 299 – 300 (David G. Adams, Richard M. Cooper, & Jonathan S. Kahan eds., 1997).
5Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 299. The organization was composed of industry representatives and was later renamed
the National Council on Radiation Protection. Though it received a congressional charter in 1964, it remained a private body.
Id.
6Robert T. De Vore, New FDA Resource: Consumer Radiation Protection, FDA Papers, Oct. 1971, at 4.
7Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 300. Like the National Council on Radiation Protection, the Federal Radiation Council
served solely as an advisory body. It was composed of heads of executive agencies but relied on the President to direct other
agencies to comply with the standards it suggested. Id.
8Id. The Center also served a purely advisory function. It later became the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”)
former Bureau of Radiological Health and is now the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (“CDRH”). Id.
9De Vore, supra note 6, at 4.
10Id.
6The shortcomings of the absence of federal regulation of radiation-emitting products were revealed in May
1967 when GE recalled 90,000 color television sets believed to emit dangerous levels of radiation. Represen-
tative Paul G. Rogers noted that GE notiﬁed NCRH in January of that year of the potential problem but
delayed taking immediate action in favor of conducting new studies.11 A letter issued by NCRH on May 18,
1967, commended GE’s voluntary recall and simply stated that “[a]s of now there is no evidence in the hands
of NCRH to suggest that any television receivers...have excessively exposed viewers of television sets.”12
Rogers informed the House that he wrote to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”)
regarding his concern over potential radiation emissions from televisions and was told that any radiation
emission was negligible. Rogers learned the morning of May 23, 1967, that the Public Health Service believed
“that the level of radiation could reach as much as 600 times of the amount recognized as the safe level” yet
had taken no action. He called for public hearings to determine the extent of the danger and to take eﬀective
action.13 On June 13, 1967, Rogers and John Jarmin introduced House Bill 10790, which eventually became
the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act.14
On June 22, 1967, Representative John E. Moss, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance,
discussed his ﬁndings concerning the NCRH letter. Concerned about James Terrill’s statement that viewers
were not known to have been excessively exposed to radiation, Moss asked Terrill to explain the basis for
NCRH’s determination. Moss described the reply as “at the very minimum...startling.”15 Terrill revealed
that although the radiation leakage beam was directed downward, NCRH believed that the height at which
some televisions were placed did result in exposure to excessive radiation. Additionally, people sitting close
11113 Cong. Rec. 13628 (1967) (statement of Paul G. Rogers), reprinted in I Legislative History of Radiation Control
for Health and Safety Act of 1968 2 (U.S. Bureau of Radiological Health 1975) [hereinafter “I Legislative History”].
12113 Cong. Rec. 13628, 13629 (1967), reprinted in I Legislative History, supra note 11, at 2 (letter of James G. Terrill,
Jr.).
13Id.
14Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1967, H.R. 10790, 90th Cong. (1967), reprinted in I Legislative History,
supra note 11, at 4.
15113 Cong. Rec. 16964, 16965 (1967), reprinted in I Legislative History, supra note 11, at 6 (statement of John E.
Moss).
7to televisions could be exposed to excessive radiation. The radiation was not expected to aﬀect people who
watched television in “normal viewing” conditions, though it was possible that even those people could be
overexposed. Terrill concluded that “any color television receiver suspected of emitting excessive X-radiation
which could expose individuals in other than a normal viewing situation should not be operated in that lo-
cation [until repaired].”16 Based on NCRH’s veriﬁcation of the dangers, Moss asked for hearings to reassure
the public that the government would prevent unsafe products from entering the marketplace.17
The Senate introduced versions of the bill to the Committee on Commerce18 and the Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare19 on July 10, 1967. The House introduced a total of seven bills between June and August
of 1967.20 Representative Jarmin announced that the House Subcommittee on Public Health and Welfare
would begin hearings on x-radiation related to color televisions on August 14, 1967.21
B. The Initial House Hearings
The initial hearings on House Bill 10790 concerned radiation emissions from televisions. Several government
witnesses noted that federal regulation would have protected consumers from unnecessary and excessive
radiation exposure by preventing the GE televisions from ever reaching the marketplace. The existing laws
provided the federal government with no authority to enforce standards or to require testing or reporting
of potential radiation hazards. GE acted responsibly in recalling and repairing the televisions, but it was
not compelled to do so by law.22 Wilbur J. Cohen stated that 7.4 million color television receivers had
16Id. (letter of James G. Terrill, Jr.).
17Id.
18S. 2067, 90th Cong. (1st Sess. 1967), reprinted in I Legislative History, supra note 11, at 12.
19S. 2075, 90th Cong. (1st Sess. 1967), reprinted in I Legislative History, supra note 11, at 14.
20Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 301.
21113 Cong. Rec. 20483 (1967), reprinted in I Legislative History, supra note 11, at 19.
22Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1967: Hearings on H.R. 10790 Before the House Subcomm. of Pub. Health
and Welfare of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong. 8 (1st Sess. 1967) (statement of Horace R.
Kornegay), reprinted in I Legislative History, supra note 11, at 82 [hereinafter “1967 House Hearings”]. General Electric
(“GE”) actually provided technical assistance to NCRH during the hearings regarding its improved testing procedures, and
NCRH modeled its study of televisions on the revised GE monitoring program. Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act:
Supplemental Hearing on H.R. 10790 Before the House Subcomm. on Pub. Health and Welfare of the Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong. 20 (2d Sess. 1968) (statement of James G. Terrill, Jr.) [hereinafter “1968 House Hearings”],
reprinted in II Legislative History of Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968 637, 649 (U.S. Bureau
of Radiological Health 1975) [hereinafter “II Legislative History”].
8been manufactured in the United States in the previous two years but that no one knew how many of those
sets were emitting hazardous radiation. While the Public Health Service had begun a program to evaluate
radiation exposure from television sets, little was being done about other electronic devices also believed to
emit radiation. Cohen supported the bill’s grant of authority and responsibility to HEW to conduct research
and control radiation hazards.23
The increasing use of electronic products that inherently release radiation reinforced awareness of the dearth
of knowledge regarding the dangers of radiation exposure. Following the television recall and the govern-
ment’s conﬂicting statements regarding potential dangers, consumers were left with little conﬁdence that
their home products were safe. Representative Jarmin summarized the current state of the knowledge:
It is my understanding that, unless exposure has been suﬃciently intense to produce bodily
injury which would be quickly apparent, the health eﬀects from radiation may not appear
for years and even may not become manifest except in some aberration in children born to
a parent who had been unknowingly irradiated. What confronts us is an invisible enemy
of human health which often may work in ways imperceptible to the victim of [sic] his or
her physician to produce eﬀects which may be harmful to more than one generation of
a family. Electromagnetic radiation, which many kinds of electronic products produce in
various forms, is something that all persons should avoid completely.24
Dr. William H. Stewart, Surgeon General, elaborated: “I think the odds [of genetic damage resulting from
the GE televisions] are very low. When one is talking odds there is always that one or two. That is why we
feel it is terribly important that these sets get back.”25
Congress recognized that the general lack of knowledge had to be corrected before eﬀective standards could
be established.26 Among the potential known dangers of radiation exposure in general were leukemia and
other cancers, cataracts, burns, sterility, and other birth defects. While the dangers of high dose radiation
231967 House Hearings, supra note 22, at 5 – 6 (Letter of Wilbur J. Cohen).
25Id. at 16 (Statement of Dr. William H. Stewart).
26Id. at 10 (Statement of L. H. Fountain).
9exposure were well documented, the eﬀects of low dose exposure resulting from standard consumer products
in the home represented a major gap in knowledge.27 The need for a federal research program was clear. Of
particular concern in establishing a research program was the large number of programs involved in the cur-
rent federal regulatory system. Representative L. H. Fountain estimated that federal grants included “more
than 175 general programs funded under more than 400 separate agencies...administered by 19 diﬀerent
departments and agencies and by more than 140 separate Federal bureaus and divisions.”28 The proposed
bill would authorize the Secretary of HEW to administer the radiation program within its current structure
and would eliminate the need for another new agency or bureau.29
The House debates initially focused on the GE televisions but quickly expanded to include other radiation
concerns. The hazards of increased medical and dental x-ray use and methods currently utilized to limit radi-
ation exposure were thoroughly discussed.30 The American College of Radiology urged enforceable national
standards and “federal responsibility for ﬁxing and enforcing standards for medical x-rays.” The College
requested that funding be provided for research and training to minimize radiation exposure not just to the
patient, but also to the radiologists and x-ray technologists who are constantly exposed to x-ray machines.31
Dr. Karl Z. Morgan, Director of the Health Physics Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, believed
the primary concern should be the elimination of unnecessary or wasteful diagnostic exposure. Noting that
over ninety percent of all exposure in the United States was due to medical exposure, Dr. Morgan believed
total exposure to manmade sources could be as low as nineteen percent of the current value if the use of
27Id. at 14 – 15 (Statement of Dr. William H. Stewart). Dr. Stewart testiﬁed in detail about the potential dangers related
to the GE televisions and the 1,800 sets that GE had not been able to recover. His full testimony can be found in the 1967
Hearings at 10 – 18. James G. Terrill, Jr., the director of NCRH, provided testimony on the technical details of radiation,
including how electronic products generate radiation, why the GE televisions leaked radiation, the potential biological eﬀects of
excessive radiation exposure, and other potential emitters of radiation. Mr. Terrill also presented a study entitled “Radiation
Exposure in Parents of Children with Mongolism (Down’s Syndrome),” which concluded that “there appears to be a deﬁnite
association between maternal exposure to ionizing radiation and Mongolism.” Id. at 18 – 76. Technical testimony on diﬀerent
types of radiation and ways manufacturers could protect consumers from excessive radiation was provided by James F. Young,
Vice President of Engineering for General Electric. Id. at 150 – 189.
281967 House Hearings, supra note 22, at 10 (Statement of L. H. Fountain).
29Id.
30Id. at 193 – 208 (Statement of James W. Nelson, Jr.).
31Id. at 320 – 29 (Statement of the American College of Radiology).
10x-ray diagnostic procedures were more carefully scrutinized.32 Dr. Morgan disputed the assumption of some
doctors that the probability of pregnancy was low and that x-ray examinations therefore resulted in very
little hazard.33 He was particularly concerned about a March 1957 report that stated that some obstetricians
advocated the use of pelvimetry as part of a routine examination.34 Dr. Morgan also conﬁrmed that occu-
pational exposure had previously resulted in shorter life spans for radiologists but that current techniques
had eliminated the risk.35 Dr. Morgan concluded by providing a list of sixty-three ways to reduce medical
diagnostic exposure.36
The American Dental Association (“ADA”) contested the conclusions drawn by Dr. Morgan and others
who testiﬁed before the House. Dr. Albert G. Richards, speaking for the ADA, emphasized the importance
of dental x-rays and the level of training dentists and hygienists received regarding radiology and radiation
protection. Dr. Richards discussed the ADA’s private eﬀorts to educate its members through videos, essays,
and clinical presentations, and its public eﬀorts to register x-ray units and to encourage compliance with
state radiation laws.37 Dr. Richards’ statements were in direct contradiction to a survey of dental x-ray
units in Pinellas County, Florida. The survey concluded that dental x-rays constituted an important source
of unnecessary exposure; that a large percentage of dentists and dental technicians had inadequate training;
that x-ray sales and repair personnel were inadequately trained to make proper adjustments to protect pa-
tients and oﬃce personnel; that the greatest source of unnecessary exposure resulted from bad technique;
32Id. at 363 – 67 (Statement of Dr. Karl Z. Morgan).
33Id. at 366 – 67. In fact, a report of the U.S. Public Health Service indicated that 4.1 million women had live births in 1963.
Of these women, 915,000 had one or more medical x-ray visits during pregnancy, while 420,000 had one or more dental x-ray
examinations. The report estimated that twenty-two percent of pregnant women had one or more x-ray examinations during
pregnancy. Id. at 367.
34Id. at 367. Dr. Morgan admitted that studies of the relationship between in utero exposure and childhood cancer were
mixed, but that a report by Dr. Brian McMahon combined all of the data and found that mortality from leukemia and other
cancers was 40 percent higher in children who had been exposed to diagnostic x-ray in utero. The excess risk due to in utero
exposure amounted to about one cancer death per 2,000 children exposed. Id. at 369 – 70.
35Id. at 371.
36Id. at 375 – 377. The recommendations covered such topics as education and training; rules, records, legal matters, and
inspections; x-ray equipment and safety devices; x-ray ﬁlms and associated equipment; and techniques and procedures.
37Id. at 408 – 12 (Statement of Dr. Albert G. Richards).
11and that public health or other government involvement was necessary for optimum protection.38 Rogers
commended the ADA on its awareness of the problem of unnecessary radiation exposure and its eﬀorts to
regulate privately but noted that considerable work needed to be done at a more accelerated pace.39
At the close of the 1967 hearings, an accident occurred at the Van de Graaﬀ accelerator facility at Gulf Oil’s
Research and Development Laboratory in Pennsylvania that further demonstrated the problems resulting
from the absence of federal regulation.40 On October 4, 1967, three employees at the facility were conducting
a standard x-ray analysis on an oil sample. The oil sample was placed in the accelerator in the target room
and the employees returned to the accelerator control console. The target room and the control console
were separated by two doors, and the accelerator, control console, and doors were connected by a safety
interlock system. After the sample had been irradiated, the operator removed the key from the control
console, proceeded through the two doors, and removed the sample. The employees noticed that the cooling
system was not working properly. While one chemist left with the sample, the two other men remained in
the room to try to repair the system. One man began feeling ill some time after and was sent to the hospital.
An evaluation of the ﬁlm badges the men had been wearing revealed that they had all been exposed to
relatively high levels of radiation. The accelerator had not shut oﬀ after irradiating the sample despite the
four separate measures that should have shut it oﬀ. Exposure was believed to be as long as twenty-four
minutes. It was unclear if this was due to human error or the failure of the safety interlock system.41
Further investigation indicated that the company received the results of the ﬁlm badge evaluations two days
38George R. McCall & Clyde H. Stagner, Report of Initial Survey of Dental X-Ray Units, Pinellas County (Fla.) Health
Department, reprinted in 1967 House Hearings, supra note 22, at 413. Pinellas County began surveying dentists’ oﬃces in
1961 but decided to resurvey the oﬃces following a request from a dentist. The second survey determined that the dentist had
been overexposing himself to radiation for ﬁve years. Another survey revealed that a dentist and his assistant had received
excessive radiation to their hands due to the practice of holding dental ﬁlm in patients’ mouths during x-ray exposure. Of the
forty-three oﬃces and seventy-one dental x-ray units surveyed, “34 timers were inaccurate, 15 required additional ﬁltration, 8
required proper collimation. Three oﬃces had inadequate x-ray protection for personnel, two dental units lacked preset timers
to stop x-ray exposures, and in seven dental oﬃces personnel were holding the dental ﬁlm during x-ray exposures. In addition,
gonadal shielding was used in only ﬁve oﬃces and only fourteen dark rooms were adequately light tight. In almost every oﬃce
recommendations were made for the reduction of personnel exposure to radiation....” Id. at 415.
391967 House Hearings, supra note 22, at 416.
40Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 301.
411967 House Hearings, supra note 22, at 426 – 28 (Statements of James G. Terrill and Dr. Raymond T. Moore).
12after the accident and immediately notiﬁed the Pennsylvania Department of Health. NCRH was not notiﬁed
until October 10, or six days after the accident, as there was no duty to notify the federal government follow-
ing serious x-ray exposure. The interlock system had not been checked prior to the accelerator’s activation
because the state and the company did not require routine checks. The target room provided no visible or
audible indication that the accelerator had not been turned oﬀ. Dr. Raymond T. Moore, who visited the
facility after the incident, stated that it would be very diﬃcult for an individual to identify the noise of a
running accelerator. Mr. Terrill and Dr. Moore recommended mandatory notiﬁcation in cases of serious
x-ray exposure to ensure high quality medical care, and a requirement to check fail-safe systems.42 This
incident concluded the initial hearings on House Bill 10790.43
C. The Initial Senate Hearings
The initial Senate Hearings on Senate Bill 2067 began on August 30, 1967.44 The Senate began by modifying
the act to provide more discretion to HEW by expanding coverage to include, but not be limited to, the
entire range of radiation emitting devices.45 Senator E.L. Bartlett stated that a federal radiation control
program would supplement current state, local, and regional programs. The Senate’s current bill only regu-
lated standards prior to introduction into commerce, with inspections and regulations post-sale being left to
the states. Senator Bartlett noted, however, that the course of the hearings could reveal the need for federal
regulation post-sale following the model of the Atomic Energy Commission (“AEC”).46
42Id. at 430 – 31.
43Several statements were submitted for the record following the close of the hearings. Professor Russell H. Morgan recom-
mended that the bill include only ionizing radiation because it was the only form of radiation known to produce biological
eﬀects. Id. at 435. However, this seemed clearly to contravene a central purpose of the bill, which was to understand the
eﬀects of all forms of radiation on consumers to ensure maximum protection. The American College of Radiology noted that
the beneﬁts of properly administered x-ray procedures outweighed the risk but recognized that other consumer goods provided
no comparable beneﬁt and should not require technical proﬁciency for safe operation. It therefore supported federal standards
for all radiation emitting products. Id. at 441 – 42. Two studies on microwave ovens were also presented. See H. S. Seth
& S. Michaelson, Microwave Hazards Evaluation, 35 Aerospace, Aug. 1964, reprinted in 1967 House Hearings, supra note
22, at 453; Joseph H. Vogelman, A Comparative Analysis of Biological Eﬀects of Microwave Energy, reprinted in 1967 House
Hearings, supra note 22, at 460.
44Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 2067 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 90th
Cong. 1 (1st Sess. 1967), reprinted in I Legislative History, supra note 11, at 364 [hereinafter “1967 Senate Hearings”].
451967 Senate Hearings, supra note 44, at 3.
46Id. at 5.
13The testimony of Hanson Blatz, director of the Oﬃce of Radiation for the New York City Department of
Health, illustrated the strengths and weaknesses of local regulation. While the New York City Department
of Health had adopted and enforced standards to protect citizens from excessive or unnecessary radiation,
citizen inquiries and complaints revealed that unnecessary radiation was being emitted from wrist and pocket
watches; religious articles; static eliminators; voltage rectiﬁer tubes; radioactive blankets; bandages; electric
heating pads; and television sets. Additionally, considerable quantities of radium had been lost by physi-
cians, generally the result of carelessness on the part of the shippers, users, and carriers. However, a local
law that revoked physicians’ licenses to possess radium if the loss occurred due to carelessness had been
successful in essentially eliminating losses.47 New York State required the licensing of x-ray technicians,
a clear step to improve the quality and safety of x-ray procedures, but Mr. Blatz noted that only ﬁfteen
percent of x-ray operators fell within this category. The majority of owners and users of x-ray equipment
were physicians in private oﬃces who had no formal training in radiology. Shielding of x-ray equipment
to protect passersby was dependent on an honor system that many operators overlooked. The New York
City system actually represented what Mr. Blatz believed was the most comprehensive radiation control
program in the country.48 Though Mr. Blatz did not believe that a federal research program for x-rays was
47Id. at 11 – 12 (Statement of Hanson Blatz). Between 1963 and 1965, there had been nine losses of radium, all due to
carelessness. After the health commissioner notiﬁed the physicians of the revocation policy, only one loss occurred. The lost
radium was eventually recovered. Id. at 12.
48Id. at 16 – 18. New York City had an oﬃce and laboratory with forty-ﬁve people devoted to radiation control. Other cities
had programs through their states’ health departments, and none exercised the control that New York City did over radiation
emissions. New York State had a division of radiological health, but it depended on counties to develop individual programs.
It had no enforcement authority, which resulted in some counties being quite inactive. Id. at 17.
14necessary,49 he supported federal radiation standards.50 He agreed that authority should be given to set
standards for microwave ovens, laser equipment, and electronic heating equipment.51
The current federal regulatory regime was outlined towards the end of the hearings. Government regulation
of radiation was “divided among the ﬁfty State governments, several city governments which have been
granted such authority, six Federal departments, a Federal Council, and a Federal Commission.”52 The De-
partment of Agriculture set standards for bacon irradiation. HEW administered the Public Health Service
and NCRH, but neither department had authority to enforce standards. The FDA regulated the eﬀects of
radiation in food processing but not the eﬀects of exposure on the processors or the public. The Department
of Interior had authority to regulate health eﬀects related to mining, which technically covered exposure to
radiation. The Department of Transportation regulated the transport of dangerous materials, including ra-
dioactive materials. The Department of Labor had recently begun regulating radiation exposure in uranium
mining. The Bureau of Standards of the Department of Commerce had been conducting research on x-rays
but had no authority to set standards. The Federal Radiation Council advised the President on radiation
matters but also had no enforcement authorities. The AEC had the most extensive experience and regula-
49Mr. Blatz believed the hazards of x-rays and the methods of limiting excess or unnecessary radiation exposure were
well known and therefore did not require additional research. Id. at 18. He submitted an article that detailed his research
on radiation exposure and methods of reduction. Hanson Blatz, Common Cause of Excessive Patient Exposure in Diagnostic
Radiology, reprinted in 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 44, at 25. Dr. Karl Z. Morgan disagreed with Mr. Blatz’s conclusions,
however. Dr. Morgan believed that research in the United States was actually lagging behind research conducted by the Soviet
Union regarding the eﬀects of ionizing radiation on the central nervous system. While Dr. Morgan agreed with Mr. Blatz’s
statement that more was known about the eﬀects of radiation than other environmental hazards, he noted that the fortunate
lack of radiation accidents had resulted in limited data on the eﬀects on humans. Dr. Morgan therefore suggested improved
mandatory training in radiology; a federal research program; federal inspections of x-ray devices (both he and Mr. Morgan
noted the common use of outdated x-ray devices and the attendant dangers); and speciﬁc standards for maximum dose exposure.
1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 44, at 35 – 38.
501967 Senate Hearings, supra note 44, at 18 – 20. Mr. Blatz also noted that enforcement of standards was actually fairly
easy. An example included watches that were manufactured with radium to allow them to glow. It was discovered that young
people often placed the watches near their abdomens, only inches from their reproductive organs, and that the watches exceeded
allowable exposure limits set out in the New York City Health Code. Mr. Blatz’s department notiﬁed the manufacturers and
policed a few stores where the watches were sold. The manufacturers learned quickly that the watches could not be sold in
New York City and removed them from the market. Mr. Blatz believed that the watches were exported to be sold elsewhere.
Id. at 18 – 19.
51Id. at 23.
52Warren H. Donnelly, Federal Authority to Set Standards for Radiation, reprinted in 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 44,
at 339, 358.
15tory authority, but its authority was limited to the use of source, byproduct, and special nuclear material.53
The study recommended further research prior to setting standards and a federal radiation program in the
model of the AEC.54
Several months after the close of the initial Senate Hearings, Senator Bartlett summarized the current state
of radiation exposure.55 Radiation exposure had become a serious problem because of the increased use by
physicians, dentists, radiologists, engineers, and other professions, and because technological advances had
created many new sources of radiation.56 Senator Randolph noted that there was little current consumer
danger related to microwaves and lasers because most uses were within the government. Consequently, the
biological eﬀects of radiation from microwave or laser use had not been well studied. Senator Bartlett an-
ticipated, however, that technological advances would greatly increase their use in basic consumer products
and noted that further hearings would be held to discuss these sources.57
D. The Passage of House Bill 10790
In President Lyndon Johnson’s February 6, 1968, message to Congress, he advocated passage of the Haz-
ardous Radiation Act:
It has been said that each civilization creates its own hazards. Ours is no exception. While
modern technology has enriched our daily lives, it has sometimes yielded unexpected and
unfortunate side eﬀects...Now modern science must be put to work on these hazards –
particularly the hazards which confront the consumer. The [Radiation Control for Health
and Safety Act] will give the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare authority to
conduct intensive studies of the hazards and set and enforce standards to control them,
[and] require manufacturers to recall defective equipment and devices.58
On March 20, 1968, the House of Representatives passed and sent to the Senate House Bill 10790. The
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee weakened the bill before passage by extending the time
53Id. at 358 – 60.
54Id. at 371.
55113 Cong. Rec. 36229 (1967), reprinted in I Legislative History, supra note 11, at 618.
56Id. at 36231.
57Id. at 36240. Testimony was eventually received on the Army’s policy regarding x-rays and lasers. Radiation Control for
Health and Safety Act: Hearings on S. 2067, S. 3211, and H.R. 10790 Before the Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong. 764 (2d
Sess. 1968), reprinted in II Legislative History, supra note 22, at 736, 934 [hereinafter “1968 Senate Hearings”].
16for compliance with federal standards from between six months and one year to one year and two years,
respectively, and by reducing the maximum civil ﬁne from $400,000 to $200,000. The House Committee
also required that the Secretary of HEW consult with the Commerce Secretary for programs on testing
and evaluating radiation and added a provision allowing appeals to the courts.59 The House Committee’s
version passed by a 382-0 roll-call vote.60 The Senate responded by holding further hearings to understand
the full extent of the radiation problem.61 The Senate Commerce Committee reported its version of the
bill on July 17, 1968.62 The Senate strengthened the bill by adding provisions directing the Secretary of
HEW to conduct speciﬁc studies.63 The Senate also increased the maximum civil ﬁne back to $400,000 but
added a provision allowing the Secretary of HEW discretion to remit or mitigate penalties.64 The Senate
Committee estimated its modiﬁcations would increase the costs of the radiation control program from $8.5
million to $10.3 million but believed this was necessary to deal properly with the absence of federal regulatory
authority, state programs that were “inadequate to provide uniform, coordinated controls,” and voluntary
standards that were inadequate to guarantee compliance.65
The Senate added three amendments prior to its ﬁnal passing of the bill on October 3, 1968. Senator Hugh
Scott’s amendment required that performance standards apply only to components “in the context of the
fully assembled products for which they were intended.”66 Senator Ralph W. Yarborough’s amendment
59114 Cong. Rec. 7062 (1968), reprinted in II Legislative History, supra note 22, at 713. See also Floor Action: Radiation
Control, 26 Cong. Q. 696 (1968).
60Floor Action: Radiation Control, supra note 59, at 696.
611968 Senate Hearings, supra note 57. The hearings included updates on the current state of scientiﬁc knowledge, statements
from government agencies, and testimony from aﬀected parties.
62Sen. R. No. 90-1432 (1968).
63Committee Roundup: Radiation Control, 26 Cong. Q. 2054, 2056 – 57 (1968). Speciﬁcally, the Senate version called for
“(1) a study of present state and federal control of health hazards from electronic products radiation and other types of ionizing
radiation; (2) a study to determine the necessity for the development of standards for the use of nonmedical electronic products
for commercial and industrial purposes; and (3) a study of the development and procedures for the detection and measurement
of electronic product radiation from products manufactured or imported prior to the eﬀective date of any applicable standard.”
Id. at 2057.
64Id. at 2057.
65Id. (internal quotations omitted).
66Floor Action: Radiation Control, 26 Cong. Q. 2725, 2732 (1968). Senator Scott explained that some components of
electronic products may emit excessive radiation but that proper shielding in the completed product could eliminate the risk.
17extended protection under the act to workers as well as consumers.67 The ﬁnal amendment by Senator Paul
J. Fannin exempted electrical products used by licensed doctors, dentists, or hospitals. The amendment was
believed to be needed to appease the medical profession.68 This was not enough to appease the House, how-
ever. The House, which started a bill that was eventually backed by the President and that all of Congress
seemed to agree was necessary, fell to strong lobbying eﬀorts by the electronics industry.69
Representative Rogers adamantly opposed Senate language allowing the seizure of products found to be
in violation, extending protection to workers on assembly lines, and allowing the Secretary of HEW broad
discretion to inspect plants. The Senate conceded to Rogers to ensure passage of the bill before Congress
adjourned. The ﬁnal bill as passed was severely weakened. Inspections were allowed only in limited cir-
cumstances. Workers were no longer protected. Manufacturers were granted much more time to come into
compliance with standards. The maximum civil penalty decreased from $400,000 to $300,000. Senate lan-
guage requiring review of standards at least once every two years was dropped. Advisory standards for the
licensing and training of x-ray technicians were dropped.70 The House did accept a modiﬁed provision re-
quiring manufacturers to repair or replace defective products and did drop the language granting exemptions
to licensed physicians, dentists, or hospitals. The conference report was adopted by the House and Senate
on October 11, 1968, though without the signature of Senator Yarborough, who believed the compromised
bill was too weak.71 Congress passed the bill on October 18, 1968.72
67Id.
68Id.
69House-Weakened Radiation Control Bill Cleared, 26 Cong. Q. 2971 (1968). The lobbying eﬀort was ﬁnanced by the
Electronic Industries Association and led by former Postmaster General J. Edward Day.
70Senator Jennings Randolph pushed for years following enactment of H.R. 10790 to add this provision. He secured Senate
committee approval of mandatory standards for training and licensing of x-ray machine operators several times. However,
obstacles to enactment included anti-regulatory moods in Congress, House objections, and complaints of high cost by the
American Medical Association, the ADA, and the Carter administration. One of Randolph’s biggest complaints was that the
Bureau of Radiological Health was not urging mandatory licensing when it was aware of the problems. See Elizabeth Wehr,
Senate Panel Backs Federal Standards for X-ray Operators, Cong. Q. 2779, 2779 – 2781 (1980). Senator Randolph ﬁnally
tucked the provision into a reconciliation bill in 1981. See Ann Pelham, Health Spending Cut by 25 Percent, Cong. Q. 1501,
1501 (1981).
71H.R. Rep. No. 90-1971 (1968). See also House-Weakened Radiation Control Bill Cleared, supra note 69, at 2981. Day’s
language was adopted nearly verbatim for the provision regarding plant inspections. Id. at 2972.
72Pub. L. No. 90-602, 82 Stat. 1173 (1968). The Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act has not undergone any
18III. The Basic Workings of the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968
The RCHSA is administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS”)73 through the FDA.
The FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health (“CDRH”) is charged with the responsibility of
carrying out the provisions of the RCHSA.74 The act applies to any electronic product, deﬁned as “(A) any
manufactured or assembled product which, when in operation, (i) contains or acts as part of an electronic
circuit and (ii) emits ...electronic product radiation, or (B) any manufactured or assembled article which
is intended for use as a component, part, or accessory of a product described in clause (A) and which
in operation emits...such radiation.”75 This section begins by outlining the major provisions of the act,
FDA actions pursuant to those provisions, and the scope of FDA authority under the act. It concludes by
discussing the interaction of the RCHSA with other federal statutes later enacted.
A. The Major Provisions of the RCHSA
The RCHSA directs the Secretary to “establish and carry out an electronic product radiation control program
designed to protect the public health and safety from electronic product radiation.”76 Speciﬁcally, the
major substantive amendments. It was recodiﬁed in 1990 as part of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) and
renamed the Electronic Product Radiation Control (“EPRC”) provisions of the FDCA. It was originally codiﬁed as part of the
Public Health Service Act at 42 U.S.C. 263c – 263n. 21 U.S.C. § 360hh – 360ss (2005). See also Bennett & Dormer, supra note
4, at 303 n.17; Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law 794 (2d ed. 1991). This paper will refer
to the act by its original title.
73Formerly the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The department names are used interchangeably throughout
this paper.
74Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 303. See also Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Electronic Product Radiation
Control, at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/comp/eprc.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2006). The CDHR, then the Bureau of Radiological
Health, was assigned to the FDA on May 17, 1971, and “thus became responsible for reducing unnecessary human exposure
to man-made radiation in the use of electronic products and in the application of radiation in the healing arts.” Radiological
Health Protection, FDA Papers, Dec. 1971 – Jan. 1972, at 43, 43. CDRH also administers its program under the authority of
the Medical Devices Amendments to the FDCA and the Mammography Quality Standards Act (“MQSA”). Center for Devices
and Radiological Health, The CDRH Radiological Health Program: Adapting to Current Public Health Needs: 2005 – 2010 5
(2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/radhlth/rhprogram.pdf [hereinafter “CDRH, Adapting”].
7521 U.S.C. § 360hh(2) (2005).
76Id. § 360ii(a). “Electronic product radiation” is deﬁned as “(A) any ionizing or non-ionizing electromagnetic or particulate
radiation, or (B) any sonic, infrasonic, or ultrasonic wave, which is emitted from an electronic product as the result of the
19Secretary is directed to “prescribe performance standards for electronic products to control the emission of
electronic product radiation;”77 to “plan, conduct, coordinate, and support research, development, training,
and operational activities to minimize the emissions of and the exposure of people to, unnecessary electronic
product radiation;”78 to “develop, test, and evaluate the eﬀectiveness of procedures and techniques for
minimizing exposure to electronic product radiation;”79 to refuse admission of electronic products oﬀered
for importation which fail to comply with the act;80 and to inspect facilities when the “Secretary ﬁnds for
good cause that the methods, tests, or programs related to electronic product radiation safety ...may not
be adequate or reliable.”81 The major provisions of the act are discussed below.
1. Performance Standards
Radiation safety performance standards are the crux of the act. In setting the standards, the Secretary must
consider “the latest available scientiﬁc and medical data in the ﬁeld of electronic product radiation; the stan-
dards currently recommended by (i) other Federal agencies...and (ii) public or private groups with expertise
in the ﬁeld...; and the reasonableness and technical feasibility of such standards....”82 The Secretary must
also consult with the Technical Electronic Product Radiation Safety Standards Committee.83 Standards
may prescribe maximum radiation emission levels and require certiﬁcation by the manufacturer that the
product conforms to federal standards.84 “Such standards may include provisions for the testing of such
products and the measurement of their electronic product radiation emissions, may require the attachment
operation of an electronic circuit in such product.” 21 U.S.C. § 360hh(1) (2005). Ionizing radiation creates electrically charged
ions capable of disrupting life processes. X-rays are an example. Though nonionizing radiation cannot create ions, it can
adversely aﬀect human health. Examples include microwaves and light. See De Vore, supra note 6, at 4.
7721 U.S.C. § 360kk(a)(1) (2005).
78Id. § 360ii(a)(2).
79Id. § 360ii(a)(5).
80Id. § 360mm(a).
81Id. § 360nn(a).
82Id.
83Id. § 360kk(f). The Committee is composed of ﬁve members from governmental agencies, ﬁve members from aﬀected
industries, and ﬁve members from the general public, including one representative of organized labor. The Committee’s
Charter is available at www.fda.gov/cdrh/panel/charter/charter-teprssc.doc.
84Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 304.
20of warning signs and labels, and may require the provision of instructions for the installation, operation, and
use of such products.”85 Each regulation must take eﬀect no sooner than one year and no later than two
years after the date on which the standard is issued.86 Judicial review of regulations is allowed in the federal
courts of appeals.87 The ﬁrst four standards set by the FDA are discussed brieﬂy below. Their progression
and current statuses are discussed more thoroughly in Part IV.
The television receiver standard went into eﬀect on January 15, 1970, and was carried out in three phases,
with the third phase to conclude on June 1, 1971.88 Testing on 259 televisions during the second phase re-
vealed that all receivers had met the operating conditions required during that phase. This was a remarkable
success, as evidenced by comparison to a study by the National Committee on Radiation Protection and
Measurements (“NCRP”) conducted between December 1967 and January 1968. NCRP tested 1,124 color
televisions of various makes and models and found 268 to emit measurable levels of radiation. Two sets had
radiation emissions exceeding the scale reading of the survey instrument. NCRP concluded that the absence
of radiation emissions from more than three quarters of the televisions indicated that industry could, and
for the most part was, manufacturing safe televisions.89
The microwave oven standard was issued on October 6, 1970, with compliance required by October 6, 1971.
The setting of the microwave standard demonstrated the eﬀectiveness of the bill. A 1967 Department of De-
fense survey found that twenty four out of thirty microwave ovens at Walter Reed Hospital leaked potentially
hazardous radiation. One leaked radiation suﬃcient to produce eye cataracts. The Department estimated
that 40,000 microwave ovens would be purchased that year, and that the total could eventually rise to half
a million if development continued as anticipated.90 A survey of 4,700 microwave ovens conducted in 1970
8521 U.S.C. § 360kk(a)(1) (2005).
86Id. § 360kk(c).
87Id. § 360kk(d).
88De Vore, supra note 6, at 8.
89See National Center for Radiological Health, A Survey of X-Radiation from Color Television Sets in the Washington, D.C.
Metropolitan Area 11 – 12, 20 (1968), in 1968 House Hearings, supra note 22, at 25.
90Sen. R. No. 90-1432 4 (1968).
21revealed that ten percent of the ovens leaked radiation above the voluntary industry maximum. The industry
voluntarily took corrective measures on the estimated 10,000 ovens believed to have a “strong potential” to
exceed the industry maximum.91 When the standard became eﬀective, the FDA could state that microwaves
were safe for consumers to use.
The third standard applied to electronic equipment used in high school and college science classes. Electron
tubes used for demonstrations were found to leak radiation in excess of the recommended maximum for
students under the age of eighteen. The sole manufacturer of the tubes agreed to stop sales of the tubes and
to recall them from distributors. The manufacturer eventually redesigned two types of tubes and stopped
making the third.92
The fourth standard applied to x-ray equipment, the hazards of which were thoroughly discussed in the
hearings. The standard aimed to reduce both patient and operator exposure. Patient overexposure during
examinations resulted primarily from the use of primary beams of x-ray that were larger than the ﬁlm being
used. The ﬁrst x-ray standards, enacted on August 1, 1974, included over sixty performance speciﬁcations,
including required use of a device that could restrict the x-ray beam to the size of the ﬁlm being used.93
The FDA helped manufacturers come into compliance by designing the device needed to restrict the x-ray
beams.
Performance standards have now been issued for ﬂuoroscopic equipment,94 computed tomography (CT)
91Radiological Health Protection, supra note 74, at 45.
92De Vore, supra note 6, at 9.
93X Rays: Focusing on Patient Protection, FDA Consumer, June 1975, at 8, 9.
9421 C.F.R. § 1020.32 (2005).
22equipment,95 cabinet x-ray systems,96 laser products,97 sunlamps,98 mercury vapor lamps,99 and ultrasonic
therapy equipment.100
2. Research
The Congressional hearings demonstrated the clear need for a federal research program. The FDA was
charged with controlling man-made radiation in electronic products and medical products, while environ-
mental radiation and radioactive materials were regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
and AEC, respectively. In 1971, forty percent of the Bureau of Radiological Health’s resources were trans-
ferred to the EPA. Of the remaining $10.3 million, $2.9 million was allocated to grants and contracts to
support research and training and applied research.101
While the biological eﬀects of high-dose ionizing radiation from such products as x-ray machines were well-
known,102 little was known about the eﬀects of repeated low-dose radiation and of exposure to non-ionizing
95Id. § 1020.33.
96Id. § 1020.44. Cabinet x-ray systems include baggage x-ray machines at airports. Between 1968 and 1972, there were
147 attempted hijacks of U.S. aircraft, ninety one of which were successful. The President directed the Federal Aviation
Administration (“FAA”) to begin screening passengers. The original screening program was done by hand and relied on the
screeners’ determination that a passenger looked suspicious. When the use of x-ray systems became more common, states
turned to the FDA for guidance on safety for screeners and passengers. The greatest concern was possible human exposure
to the primary beam of radiation. Some of the systems in use at the time allowed operators to hold bags in the machines
and to directly expose their hands. A secondary concern was damage to undeveloped photographic ﬁlm. The FDA quickly
issued recommended safety guidelines, which were soon adopted by all but four states. The remaining four states had already
established more detailed and in some cases more restrictive requirements. The standard became eﬀective on April 10, 1975.
See Michael E. Shaﬀer, X-Raying Baggage To Thwart Skyjackers, FDA Consumer, July – Aug. 1974, at 16.
9721 C.F.R. § 1040.10 (2005).
98Id. § 1040.20.
99Id. § 1040.30. Mercury vapor lamps are more eﬃcient and longer lasting than regular lamps. The lamp is surrounded
by a hard borosilicate glass envelope to ﬁlter out shortwave radiation produced by the electrical current passing through the
mercury-argon vapor. In December 1974, the FDA learned that eight people who had been playing volleyball in a school gym
had suﬀered burns from ultraviolet radiation exposure. A mercury vapor lamp in the gym had been broken but continued
to burn. Further investigation revealed at least eight other incidents. Annabel Hecht, Shedding Some Light On Light, FDA
Consumer, Sep. 1976, at 10, 13. The current standards require that self-extinguishing lamps cease operation within ﬁfteen
minutes of breakage or removal of the outer envelope. 21 C.F.R. § 1040.30(d) (2005).
10021 C.F.R. § 1050.10 (2005).
101Radiological Health Protection, supra note 74, at 43.
102Short term eﬀects included nausea, anemia, fatigue, blood and intestinal disorders, and loss of hair. Long term eﬀects
included cancers and cataracts. Very high exposure was believed to cause injury to the central nervous system and possibly
death. In children, small increases in ionizing radiation exposure were believed to increase the risk of leukemia. De Vore, supra
note 6, at 5. For a detailed explanation of radiation and its eﬀects as understood in 1979, see Bill Rados, Primer on Radiation,
FDA Consumer, July – Aug. 1979, at 4.
23radiation, such as microwaves and light. Because scientists had not identiﬁed a safe level of radiation, they
believed that all forms of radiation included some risk to human health. The rise in use of electronic products
such as microwave ovens, lasers, and ultrasound equipment further ampliﬁed the need for research on the
biological eﬀects of non-ionizing radiation. Early studies revealed that x-ray or ultraviolet light exposure
increased the probability that certain cells would develop tumors.103 Other studies involved the eﬀects of
microwaves on monkeys and on military occupations involving the use of microwaves.104 A detailed discus-
sion of speciﬁc studies and their use in setting standards is discussed in Part IV.
The Bureau’s research also contributed technological devices to aid in the reduction of radiation emissions.
The Bureau quickly developed instruments to help in the detection of radiation emissions from televisions
and supported the development of a laser radiation detection monitor.105 Diﬀerent instruments were de-
veloped for testing in the factory and for use by television servicemen.106 A separate meter was developed
to detect radiation leakage from microwave ovens.107 The Bureau also developed technology to aid in its
research, such as a chamber capable of controlling animal research environments.108
CDRH was created in 1982 to combine the FDA’s activities under the RCHSA and the Medical Devices
Amendments. The centralization of the FDA’s research programs has reduced ineﬃciencies, thus allowing
for a more focused and eﬀective research program.
3. Enforcement
The FDA’s enforcement authorities under the RCHSA include recalls, seizures, and regulation of imports. If
a manufacturer determines that its product is not in compliance with federal standards, it must notify the
FDA.109 The manufacturer must make the initial determination of the signiﬁcance of risk associated with
103De Vore, supra note 6, at 5.
104Radiological Health Protection, supra note 74, at 46.
105Id.
106De Vore, supra note 6, at 9.
107Id.
108Id. at 5.
10921 U.S.C. § 360ll (2005).
24the defect. If it determines the risk is low, it can request an exemption from a mandatory duty to notify
consumers.110 Similarly, the FDA has a duty to notify a manufacturer if the FDA discovers a violation
of its standards.111 The manufacturer is provided a regulatory hearing in which it may explain why an
exemption should be granted, but the hearing lacks procedural protections provided by a traditional trial.112
If no exemption from public notiﬁcation is granted, the manufacturer must correct the defect at its own
expense or refund the purchase price.113 The FDA may seize non-compliant products if a manufacturer fails
to institute a recall.114
Historically, the FDA rarely instituted adversarial proceedings pursuant to the RCHSA. “A basic precept
of FDA enforcement authority is the belief that a majority of persons desire to comply with the law and
will comply voluntarily when given information as to what is required and what violations appear to ex-
ist.”115 The FDA and manufacturers developed a non-adversarial relationship early as they worked together
to develop the standards. Almost all actions brought by the FDA settled before trial.116 Manufacturers
also rarely challenged the FDA’s enforcement authority. Only two adversarial administrative hearings have
occurred since enactment of the RCHSA.
The ﬁrst adversarial hearing began in 1974 with routine testing of television sets. The FDA removed a
component from a color television to simulate a failure and found that this caused excess radiation emission
in violation of federal standards. Further testing of other models by the same manufacturer revealed that
110Id. § 360ll(a)(2).
111Id. § 360ll(e).
112Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 306. The Commissioner of Food and Drugs appoints a presiding oﬃcer who is “free
from bias or prejudice.” Parties may present evidence and cross examine witnesses, but the manufacturers may not call agency
staﬀ as witnesses. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply, thus preventing manufacturers from challenging the authenticity
and reliability of documents presented by the FDA. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the proceedings, see Ronald J. Greene,
Informal FDA Hearings, Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 354 (1977).
11321 U.S.C. § 360ll(f) (2005).
114Marie A. Urban, The FDA’s Policy on Seizures, Injunctions, Civil Fines, and Recalls, 47 Food & Drug L.J. 411, 411
(1992).
115Id.
116Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 307 – 308. From the 1968 enactment of the RCHSA to 1996, only thirty-two actions
had been brought. Only three went to trial. It has been suggested, however, that the recodiﬁcation of the RCHSA as part of the
FDCA and the consolidation of the Bureau of Radiological Health into the more general Center for Devices and Radiological
Health will end the non-adversarial relationship. Id.
25300,000 to 400,000 color television sets posed the same risk. Matsushita Electric Company, J.C. Penney, and
W.T. Grant, deﬁned as manufacturers under the RCHSA, were granted an administrative hearing to chal-
lenge the FDA’s ﬁndings. The companies sought an exemption based on their ﬁndings that a failure like the
one the FDA had simulated had never occurred and was unlikely ever to occur. The companies stated that
their quality control programs were suﬃcient to ensure this. The FDA rejected the claim for exemption.117
The manufacturers chose not to seek judicial review and instead submitted the required corrective action
plan in which they agreed to recall the televisions.118
The second proceeding involved 36,000 microwaves manufactured by GE. The FDA had determined that the
microwaves leaked radiation in excess of the federal performance standard. GE sought an exemption from
notiﬁcation and corrective action. The hearing oﬃcer determined that GE had not proven that no person
would or could be injured by the excess radiation, and GE eventually submitted a corrective action plan to
repair the microwaves.119
In addition to seeking injunctions and requiring recalls and repairs, the FDA also relies on the imposition
of civil penalties. The RCHSA authorizes a civil penalty of not more than $1000 for each product involved
or for each act or omission in violation of the statute, with the maximum penalty for a single party for any
related series of violations limited to $300,000.120 The FDA’s stated policy is not to warn manufacturers
prior to considering penalties when it determines that “a violative product will cause serious adverse health
consequences or death, or where responsible persons show intentional disregard for the law.”121 The FDA
117Walter E. Gundaker, Getting the Picture On TV Recall, FDA Consumer, Mar. 1975, at 8, 13.
118Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 309.
119Id.
12021 U.S.C. § 360pp(b) (2005). In 2004, the penalties were raised to $1,100 per violation and $330,000 maximum, in accordance
with the Federal Civil Penalties Inﬂation Adjustment Act of 1990. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Compliance Policy
Guides Manual Sec. 390.300, 2004 WL 3363378 (updated July 29, 2004) [hereinafter “FDA, Compliance Policy”]. The FDA
also has authority to impose civil penalties under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, the Prescription Drug
Marketing Act of 1987, The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, the Mammography Quality Standards Act of 1992, the Generic
Drug Enforcement Act of 1992, and the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996. Marc J. Scheineson & Robert J. Kaufman, FDA
Lacks Authority to Impose Civil Monetary Fines, Legal Backgrounder, Oct. 17, 2003.
121FDA, Compliance Policy, supra note 120. These actions include failure to notify the FDA of a known defect; the failure
to submit required reports related to defective products; issuance of false certiﬁcations; refusal to permit entry or to allow
inspection as required by the RCHSA; distribution of known non-compliant products; and refusal to initiate corrective action.
26generally warns manufacturers before imposing ﬁnes for distribution of non-compliant products; refusal to
notify purchasers; failure to implement an order to notify within a reasonable time; inadequate record keep-
ing; and failure to implement an adequate recall due to inadequate distribution records. Fines will generally
not be imposed for minor violations, deﬁned as those that present little or no risk of injury or danger to
health.122 Because “manufacturer” is deﬁned as “any person engaged in the business of manufacturing, as-
sembling, or importing of electronic products,”123 individuals can be held personally liable for the violations
of the company. This allows the FDA to impose civil penalties on both the corporation and individuals for
the same set of violations.124
The FDA also has the power to regulate importation of electronic products. The FDA may deny entry of
products oﬀered for importation that do not comply with federal standards. If the FDA believes that a
product denied entry cannot be brought into compliance, the manufacturer must export the product at its
own expense. Failure to export within ninety days grants the FDA the right to seize and destroy the non-
compliant products.125 The importation of multisystems is illustrative of the FDA’s authority. Multisystems
are televisions that can receive international broadcast systems. The FDA determined non-compliant mul-
tisystems did not pose a hazard to public health if sold in the United States because they were not designed
to operate on standard United States power sources. They were allowed on the understanding that the
importers would eventually sell the multisystems to consumers who were traveling or relocating overseas,
referred to as an “import-for-export” exemption.126
By 1985, the FDA believed multisystems had become operable in the United States and required that all
multisystems operable in the United States meet the television receiver standards. In 1988, the FDA issued
Id.
122Id.
12321 U.S.C. § 360hh(3) (2005).
124See United States v. Hodges X-Ray, Inc., 759 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that the FDA had authority under RCHSA
to ﬁne both the company and the principle shareholder).
12521 U.S.C. § 360mm (2005).
126K & K Merchandise Group, Inc. v. Shalala, No. 95 Civ. 10082, 1996 WL 183023, *1 – 2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 1996).
27an “import alert” that instructed FDA ﬁeld inspectors to “detain all shipments of uncertiﬁed [multisystem]
receivers until the importer establishes that the product in question is labeled for export only and cannot
receive the [U.S.] NTSC 3.58 broadcast system.”127 The FDA remained concerned that multisystems were
entering the United States market illegally, and in 1991 required that all multisystems, including those in-
tended solely for export, meet the television receiver standard. In 1992, the FDA detained multisystems
imported by K & K Merchandise Group (“K & K”) for noncompliance with federal performance standards.
K & K claimed that the FDA’s policies regarding noncompliant imported electronic products constituted
improper rulemaking. The court dismissed K & K’s claim for lack of standing. The court held that K &
K had alleged no concrete injury “because [K & K] has no legal right to import or sell its noncompliant
multisystem television receivers in the United States.”128 The court aﬃrmed Congress’ intent that any
noncompliant good qualifying for an exemption would be exported directly, not sold to U.S. distributors to
later export.129
While K & K’s troubles resulted from products that exceeded the maximum radiation emissions standards,
the FDA also has the authority to seize products that meet the emission standards but violate other provisions
of the RCHSA. In September 1991, the FDA placed a customs hold on 30,000 television sets manufactured
by Goldstar due to irregularities in its testing methods at its Korean factory. Further investigation revealed
similar problems at Goldstar’s factory in Mexico, resulting in Goldstar’s voluntary withholding of another
130,000 televisions from importation. While the test methods were determined acceptable, the instruments
were not. The company was also found to have falsiﬁed x-ray test data and to have relabeled and reboxed
televisions without proper quality control testing. Goldstar eventually submitted a corrective action plan
and retested samples of its stock. On November 27, 1991, the FDA released the televisions from detention.
127Id. at *2.
128Id. at *3.
129Id. at *5.
28This delay cost Goldstar tens of millions during the height of the selling season. None of the televisions was
ever found to emit excess radiation, a problem the FDA had not seen in many years.130
Decreased funding has required the FDA to refocus its enforcement eﬀorts, particularly regarding ﬁeldwork.
CDRH plans to emphasize inspections of manufacturers and conduct ﬁeld and lab tests on a for cause
basis only. Additionally, CDRH will increasingly use outside sources for data on adverse events and initiate
enforcement actions accordingly.
B. Interaction with Other Statutes and Agencies131
In addition to the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act, the FDA’s regulation of electronic products
also comes under the Medical Devices Amendments (“MDA”) to the FDCA and the Mammography Quality
Standards Act of 1992 (“MQSA”).132 The FDA shares its regulatory authority with the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”), and the Environmental Protection
Agency.133 This section will brieﬂy describe the role other statutes and agencies play in regulating electronic
products.
Radiation emitting electronic products that are also medical devices, such as x-ray equipment, microwave
diathermy, and surgical lasers, are also regulated by the Medical Devices Amendments of 1976.134 The MDA
was a response to the growing number and increasing complexity of medical devices. The FDA was required
to classify all medical devices in terms of safety and eﬀectiveness. The FDA was granted comprehensive con-
130Goldstar Rocked by Obsolete X-Ray Rule, Consumer Electronics, Feb. 17, 1992, at 9.
131This section is drawn largely from Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 313 – 20.
132A diagram of the FDA’s overlapping enforcement authorities can be found at
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/radhlth/pdf/overlap.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2006) [hereinafter “FDA Diagram”].
133Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 318 – 20.
134Other electronic products regulated under the Medical Devices Amendment include diagnostic ultrasound, radiation therapy,
MRI, ophthalmic instruments, sunlamps, and lithotriphter. FDA Diagram, supra note 132.
29trol over the market introduction of medical devices. Congress also chose to enact special rules for speciﬁc
devices.135 While the RCHSA protects the public from unnecessary radiation from electronic products, the
MDA ensures that marketed medical devices are safe and eﬀective for their intended use. A product that
violates the RCHSA is typically considered adulterated or misbranded under the MDA.136
The MDA was originally implemented by the Bureau of Medical Devices. Recognizing the interrelations of
the MDA and RCHSA, HHS merged the agencies in 1982, forming the Center for Devices and Radiological
Health. The conjunction of the acts grants the FDA more alternatives for enforcement. Under the MDA,
the FDA can institute a suit to seize a device, a source of contention that the Senate lost on during the
legislative hearings for the RCHSA. Other administrative actions pursued by the Senate during the hearings,
such as detention of suspected non-compliant devices, are available under the MDA. The FDA can also
pursue criminal penalties against manufacturers under the MDA.137 The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990
(“SMDA”) provided the FDA with further regulatory authority. Civil penalties were made available, and the
regulated entities were broadened to include facilities and device distributors in addition to manufacturers.
The SMDA also eliminated the “state-of-the-art” defense to the refund, repair, and replace requirement
for defective products, which aligned the SMDA with the RCHSA in this respect. The process for setting
performance standards was relaxed in an attempt to allow the FDA to establish performance standards
with the same relative ease as under the RCHSA. The FDA believes that the administration of the medical
devices acts by the same agency that administers the radiation control act has minimized inconsistent and
duplicative regulations. Though the standards for many medical devices are established by the RCHSA, the
MDA essentially controls regulation of radiation emitting medical devices.138
135Hutt & Merrill, supra note 72, at 744 – 46.
136Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 313 – 14. Bennett and Dormer note that an x-ray machine that failed to take x-rays
of proper clarity would theoretically also be in violation of the RCHSA because patients would be exposed to radiation without
any oﬀsetting beneﬁt. However, the FDA has not advanced this argument.
137Id. at 314 – 15.
138Id. at 315.
30The Mammography Quality Standards Act of 1992 regulates mammography facilities and the use of mam-
mography equipment “to ensure that all women have access to quality mammography for the detection of
breast cancer in its earliest, most treatable stages.”139 Because mammography is a type of x-ray device,
it is simultaneously regulated by the RCHSA. MQSA is part of the Public Health Services Act, where the
RCHSA was codiﬁed prior to its move to the FDCA.140 MQSA requires that all mammography facilities be
certiﬁed by the FDA141 and establishes quality standards for mammography equipment and personnel.142
Facilities are subject to regular inspections143 and sanctions including civil monetary ﬁnes.144 The act was
reauthorized in fall 2004 to extend to 2007.145
Mammography originally suﬀered from poor technique. High quality images and well-trained interpreters
are needed to diagnose a breast tumor before a lump develops.146 Improper ﬁlm processing and improper
use of image receptors resulted in poor images. Because the FDA had no authority to regulate procedures
within a facility, the American College of Radiology began accrediting mammography facilities through a
voluntary program. Medicare also required facilities that wanted to seek reimbursement to meet quality
standards.147 MQSA was needed to ensure mandatory participation in certiﬁcation programs. Improve-
ments in mammography equipment and techniques have made the process the most eﬀective measure for
early detection of breast cancer. Image quality has improved signiﬁcantly, while radiation exposure is up to
ﬁfty times less today than it was twenty years ago.148
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission shares authority with the FDA for the regulation of radiation therapy
139U.S. Food and Drug Administration, About MQSA, at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/mammography/mqsa-rev.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 9, 2006) [hereinafter “FDA, About MQSA”].
14042 U.S.C. § 263b (2005).
141Id. § 263b(b).
142Id. § 263b(f).
143Id. § 236b(g).
144Id. § 263b(h).
145FDA, About MSQA, supra note 139.
146Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 316.
147Marian Segal, Mammography Facilities Must Meet Quality Standards, FDA Consumer, Mar. 1994, at 8, 11.
148U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Frequently Asked Questions About MQSA, at
http://www.fda.gov/CDRH/MAMMOGRAPHY/cons-faq2.html#facilities (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
31systems. When the RCHSA passed in 1968, the AEC believed that the authority granted under the act did
not aﬀect the AEC. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 had charged the AEC with the control of radiation
hazards, but its authority was limited to responsibility for the “public health and safety in connection with
construction and operation of nuclear facilities and the use of source, byproduct, and special nuclear ma-
terial.”149 The AEC believed the deﬁnition of “electronic product radiation” limited authority under the
act to radiation from products that used electronic circuits and therefore distinguished it from the radiation
from nuclear sources that the AEC regulated. However, the AEC requested and was granted a provision
stating that the act “shall not be construed as superseding or limiting the functions, under any provision
of law, of any oﬃcer or agency of the United States.”150 The AEC fully admitted that the provision was
intended to protect its authority.151
Technological advances have resulted in the use of special nuclear material in medical therapy, which im-
plicates the NRC’s authority. The NRC is charged with licensing physicians and facilities that use nuclear
material in radiation therapy.152 The NRC’s stated objective is to “provide for the radiation safety of work-
ers, the general public, patients, and human research subjects.”153 The requirements for licensing include
maintenance of records;154 the protection of human research subjects;155 radiation safety aspects for medical
use of byproduct material;156 and notiﬁcation.157 Because radiation therapy systems are not considered
electronic products, the FDA regulates them as medical devices under the MDA. The FDA and NRC gen-
erally share data on radiation hazards and knowledge of incidents of patient exposure through an informal
process. Because the FDA has a broader range of regulatory options under the MDA, the NRC typically
149Sen. R. No. 90-1432 33 (1968) (Letter of Glenn T. Seaborg).
150Pub. L. No. 90-602 sec. 4, 82 Stat. 1187 (1968).
151Sen. R. No. 90-1432 31 (1968) (Letter of E.J. Bloch).
15242 U.S.C. § 2134(a) (2005); Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 319.
15310 C.F.R. § 35.1 (2005).
154Id. § 35.5.
155Id. § 35.6.
156Id. § 35.12.
157Id. § 35.14.
32defers to the FDA when regulatory action is needed. The agencies have entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding “to coordinate existing NRC and FDA regulatory programs for medical devices, drugs, and
biological products utilizing byproduct, source, or special nuclear material.”158
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) regulates consumer products, including those that
emit radiation but excluding medical devices. Products that come under the regulation of both the FDA
and the CPSC include televisions and microwave ovens. The Consumer Product Safety Act (“CPSA”) was
enacted in 1972 in response to Congress’ determination that an unacceptable number of consumer products
distributed in commerce presented an unreasonable risk of injury and that existing federal, state, and local
control was inadequate.159 The CPSA was modeled after the RCHSA, resulting in enforcement authority
that is essentially identical. This includes a repair, replace, or refund provision and the right to impose civil
penalties. Unlike the RCHSA, however, the CPSA provides for criminal sanctions and seizure of noncompli-
ant products. The CPSA typically defers to CDRH regarding radiation emissions, with deference becoming
even more common with reductions in funding.160
The Environmental Protection Agency is “technically the lead federal agency in establishing federal policy on
radiation.”161 It is charged to “advise the President with respect to radiation matters, directly or indirectly
aﬀecting health, including guidance for all Federal agencies in the formulation of radiation standards and in
the establishment and execution of programs of cooperation with States.”162 However, the EPA has typi-
cally deferred to the FDA and to CDRH regarding medical devices and electronic products to ensure that its
actions do not conﬂict with the FDA’s “responsibilities for developing product performance standards.”163
15858 Fed. Reg. 47,300 (Sep. 8, 1993); Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 319.
15915 U.S.C. § 2051 (2005).
160Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 318.
161Id. at 319.
162Id., citing Federal Radiation Council Authority, Pub. L. No. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688 (1959), transferred to EPA by Reorga-
nization Plan No. 3 of 1970, as codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 2021(h).
163Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 320, citing 51 Fed. Reg. 27,318, 27,321 (July 30, 1986). Bennett and Dormer cite the
EPA’s proposed recommendations regarding public exposure to radio frequency radiation as an example. The EPA recognized
CDRH’s jurisdiction in this area and believed FDA performance standards could more readily control excess radiation exposure.
The EPA proposed to exclude from its consideration exposure resulting from electronic consumer products.
33The FDA remains the lead agency in radiation regulation.
IV. Major Electronic Products Regulated by the RCHSA
The eﬀectiveness of the RCHSA can be seen best in the FDA’s actions regarding studies and regulations of
speciﬁc products. The FDA’s actions include setting standards, conducting research, and educating manu-
facturers and consumers. The current status of electronic products considered possibly dangerous to human
health in 1968 demonstrates the tremendous success of a federal regulatory program. While the granting
of authority to enforce standards cannot be underscored in the success of the RCHSA, it is the extensive
research program and the FDA’s eﬀorts at educating the public that have proved to be the true successes.
During the congressional debates, witnesses repeatedly emphasized the lack of knowledge regarding the bi-
ological eﬀects of radiation. The concern was not just for the lay consumers; it was also for the educated
professionals who had repeated contact with radiation emitting devices. While scientists sensed that low-
dose and non-ionizing radiation were toxic to human health, there was a complete lack of reliable evidence.
The setting of enforceable standards indicated Congress’ commitment to the elimination of unnecessary
radiation. While some combination of concern for human health and the avoidance of adverse publicity
would have led manufacturers to eliminate excess radiation to the extent feasible, the RCHSA undoubtedly
accelerated the process. Congress’ commitment to radiation protection extended not just to standard setting
and enforcement, but also to a federally-funded research and education program. This section begins with
a discussion of the products Congress identiﬁed as possibly dangerous in 1967 and 1968 to demonstrate the
signiﬁcant progress the RCHSA has made. It concludes with a discussion of cell phone regulation because
it demonstrates the interaction of the FDA’s obligations under the RCHSA with other federal statutes and
34agencies and is the area with the least deﬁnitive research and, consequently, the most controversy today.
A. Diagnostic X-Rays: Controlling the Main Source of Radiation Exposure
The regulation of x-ray machines represents perhaps the greatest success under the RCHSA. In 1968, med-
ical and dental x-ray procedures represented ninety percent of human exposure to radiation.164 Dr. Karl
Z. Morgan acknowledged the great value of x-ray procedures but noted that better screening to determine
when x-rays were appropriate and better designed devices could signiﬁcantly decrease unnecessary human
exposure.165
Following enactment of the RCHSA and growing public awareness of the possible dangers, patients began
asking how safe x-ray exposure was. Like Dr. Morgan, the FDA was careful not to undercut the tremendous
beneﬁts of x-ray procedures. The Bureau acknowledged that “[t]ens of thousands of accident victims are
saved every year because a physician can see on x-ray ﬁlm exactly what is wrong,” while “[o]thers would
have died in childhood of heart defects or obstructed digestive tracts” without x-rays.166 However, repeated
exposure to low-dose ionizing radiation did pose a real threat. The Bureau believed that physicians and den-
tists had a duty to determine when x-ray diagnoses were actually needed and to use methods that produced
the lowest possible exposure. By 1970, x-ray examinations had seen a ten percent per capita increase but
had resulted in a drop in genetically signiﬁcant dose. This indicated the ability to deliver “the best possible
diagnostic information for the least possible x-ray exposure.”167
The ﬁrst set of standards aimed to reduce unnecessary x-ray exposure by requiring beam restricting capaci-
ties. All stationary devices were required to be able to restrict the beam to the ﬁlm size. Bureau engineers
designed a device, known as a collimator, to perform this task automatically. A feature to allow images to
164For an explanation of how medical x-rays work, see Robert T. De Vore, Seeking the Safest X-Ray Picture, FDA Consumer,
Mar. 1979, at 24.
1651967 House Hearings, supra note 22, at 364.
166Robert T. De Vore, Diagnostic X Rays: How Safe Are They?, June 1973, at 4, 5.
167Id.
35be reproduced was required to reduce unnecessary exposure from retakes.168 As enacted on August 1, 1974,
the standard contained over 60 performance speciﬁcations. The FDA devised a three-pronged approach
to enforcement. First, the FDA intended to “evaluate[] reports on quality control and testing programs
submitted by x-ray equipment manufacturers, and [to] supplement this information with factory inspections
to verify that adequate testing was being conducted.” Second, the FDA inspectors, with the aid of State
inspectors, would inspect “hospitals, clinics, and other facilities to determine if the systems [had] been as-
sembled and [were] performing in accordance with the standard.” And third, the FDA would “test[] x-ray
components and some fully assembled systems in its laboratory to check for compliance.”169 The FDA would
notify manufacturers if their products failed this line of testing and would require that defective products
be repaired or replaced free of charge.170
The ﬁrst case to go to trial under the RCHSA involved a ﬁrm that assembled and installed medical x-ray
systems. Walter Wilder, owner of X-Ray of Greenville, attempted to save $2500 per installation by using
manual collimators rather than the automatic collimators required under FDA regulations. Automatic colli-
mators sense the size and shape of the ﬁlm being used and adjust the x-ray beam to limit the positive beam
exposure. Wilder attempted to evade detection by not reporting the faulty x-ray machines to the FDA as
required by law. He went so far as to prepare ﬁctitious bills of sale claiming that the machines had been
previously owned by physicians. This would allow him to avoid installing the expensive collimators under
an exception allowing upgrading of old equipment. An inspection of a chiropractic clinic in February 1983
revealed that the unit did not have the proper safety features. The FDA sent a letter to X-Ray of Greenville
and received no response, thus prompting a visit to Wilder’s oﬃce. He refused access to his company’s
records, except the ﬁctitious bills of sale. North and South Carolina state radiation control oﬃcials helped
the FDA locate eleven systems installed by Wilder that had not been reported. A U.S. District Court mag-
168Id. at 5 – 7.
169X-Rays: Focusing on Patient Protection, supra note 93, at 8, 9.
170The current standards are available at 21 C.F.R. § 1020.30 (2005).
36istrate found against Wilder on all counts. He was ordered to “provide [automatic collimators] on systems
he had installed or to refund the purchase price to his customers; to give the FDA access to all sales invoices
and other relevant business records; to ﬁle reports of assembly and certiﬁcation for all units that he had
installed but not reported; and to pay $6900 in civil penalties.”171
Another FDA concern included decreasing the dangers of x-ray examinations in general by restricting dan-
gerous products and by educating those who administered x-rays. In the early 1970’s, the FDA discovered
that an imported dental x-ray device sold as a 60,000-volt device was actually functioning at only 45,000
volts. The machines required at least ﬁve times as much exposure to produce a proper image. The FDA
suspended sales of the machines and instituted actions for their replacement or correction. The FDA also
helped institute training programs in medical and graduate schools and continued to conduct its own short
courses on radiological health for health professionals.172 The chief source of unnecessary radiation remained,
however, the use of x-ray examinations that were not needed for meaningful diagnoses.173 Widespread public
education appeared to be the solution.
One of the Bureau’s earliest actions involved public education regarding the proper use of x-rays. X-rays
were commonly used in the 1940’s and 1950’s to screen for tuberculosis (“TB”),174 but the development
of the tuberculin skin test provided a safer alternative. The Bureau and the American College of Chest
Physicians issued a joint statement in 1972 recommending that the use of mass chest x-rays for the detection
of TB and other cardiopulmonary diseases be discontinued. The value of early detection of TB in the 1940’s
171Carolyn Hommel & Richard C. Thompson, X-ray Installation Scam Exposed, FDA Consumer, June 1986, at 29.
172An example is the Radiological Health Sciences Learning Laboratory. Developed by the FDA and the University of California
Medical Center at San Francisco, the Learning Laboratory is a comprehensive education system in diagnostic radiology. “It
covers selection of patients for x-ray examinations, x-ray examination procedures, and interpretation of results...It provides
the basic information to enable physicians to make sound judgments on the desirability of x raying a patient.” The FDA also
has a series, “Radiation Protection During Medical X-Ray Examinations,” that teaches technologists how to protect themselves
and their patients from unnecessary exposure. X Rays: Focusing on Patient Protection, supra note 93, at 11. As discussed in
supra note 70, these training programs could not be made mandatory until 1981.
173De Vore, supra note 166, at 6. For example, x-rays were sometimes ordered to allay patients’ fears or to provide physicians
a record for malpractice suits, rather than when they were actually necessary for diagnosis.
174Community funds often made the x-ray screenings free to the public. Valerie Britain, Mass Chest X Rays Are On The
Way Out, FDA Consumer, Feb. 1973, at 14, 15.
37was believed to outweigh the risk. By 1973, however, the Bureau’s research had identiﬁed ﬁve reasons to
discontinue mass chest x-rays.175 The once common practice soon ended.
A second public education concern was the advisability of x-ray examinations for pregnant women. During
the initial House hearings, Dr. Morgan expressed his concern regarding the practice of some doctors to
require pelvimetries as part of routine examinations of pregnant women.176 FDA studies indicated that the
risk of danger to the fetus from x-ray exposure was actually quite low and depended on many factors. X-ray
procedures of areas other than the abdomen resulted in almost no radiation exposure to the fetus. A sin-
gle, properly conducted x-ray examination of the abdomen was very unlikely to cause birth defects. Animal
studies indicated a slight eﬀect on intelligence and behavior, though scientists were unsure if diagnostic x-ray
exposure would produce the same result. Still, several studies indicated that x-ray exposure did increase the
risk of leukemia. Additionally, unusually high levels of exposure from repeated x-ray examinations over a
short time period also posed a serious threat.177 The FDA’s education program sought to instruct physicians
on the dangers of radiation to the human embryo, to encourage physicians to ask female patients routinely if
they were pregnant, and to consult radiologists when considering abdominal x-rays on pregnant patients.178
The FDA also encouraged women to be proactive in protecting their fetuses from unnecessary radiation
by taking such simple measures as informing their doctors of possible pregnancies. The FDA continued to
stress, however, that properly performed x-ray procedures were safe enough that they should not be avoided
175Id. at 15 – 16. First, the mass screenings were never really eﬀective at detecting TB. More than ninety-ﬁve percent
of infected people were detected through other means. Mass screening only detected TB in fewer than 1/20th of 1 percent.
Second, TB was on the decline, which further decreased the likeliness that chest x-rays would detect an infection. Third, the
tuberculin skin test served as a safer and more accurate screening device. Fourth, the x-ray screening exposed the population
to unnecessary radiation when compared to the likelihood of detection. Fifth, the mobile devices often used for mass screenings
tended to expose people to ten times more radiation than ﬁxed x-ray units.
176See 1967 House Hearings, supra note 22, at 367. A pelvimetry uses x-rays to compare the size of the birth canal to the
baby’s head. It was originally used to determine if an irregular pelvis required delivery by Caesarian section. It later came to
be used when physicians were considering Caesarian deliveries for other reasons. The usefulness of pelvimetries has also been
questioned. First, small, trouble-causing pelvises are less common now. Second, babies’ heads tend to “give” suﬃciently for safe
vaginal delivery, and pelvimetries cannot predict the amount of “give.” Third, other diagnostic techniques such as ultrasound
can determine the need for Caesarian section without the use of x-rays. Roxanne Smith, X-rays For Childbirth: Risky, Costly,
Not Always Helpful, FDA Consumer, Feb. 1982, at 21, 21 – 22.
177James L. Morrison & Mark Barnett, X Rays And Pregnancy, FDA Consumer, May 1977, at 24, 24 – 25.
178X Rays: Focusing on Patient Protection, supra note 93, at 11.
38if doctors determined them to be necessary.179
By 1979, the Bureau of Radiological Health believed that x-rays were still over-prescribed. John C. Vill-
forth, director of the Bureau, believed that as many as thirty percent of the 278 million diagnostic x-rays
performed in the previous year may not have been necessary.180 Villforth explained that the FDA’s concern
about overuse of x-rays was motivated by both health and cost concerns. He estimated that medical and
dental x-rays cost the American public as much as $6 billion each year.181 He also noted that “nonradiologists
...who provided their own x-ray services used those services almost twice as often as physicians who referred
patients to consulting radiologists,” and believed that physicians and dentists did not fully appreciate the
risks they were imposing on their patients.182 The federal government, however, did address the concerns
articulated by Villforth. A presidential directive instructed Federal agencies to reduce unnecessary diagnos-
tic x-rays. On May 29, 1980, the Public Health Service asked all of its agencies, HHS, and twenty-eight
other federal departments and agencies to “review their current procedures, eliminate chest x-ray screening
not supported by the guideline, and justify any screening that would be continued.”183 The result was the
elimination of approximately 150,000 formerly required chest x-rays and savings of approximately $4 million
a year.184
Villforth also noted that the advances in mammography demonstrated technology’s ability to meet changing
needs. Mammography was recognized as an eﬀective tool for early detection of breast cancer. A low energy
x-ray beam is used to get a good contrast between normal tissue and a lump or mass in the breast. The
process results in less radiation reaching the ﬁlm and more being absorbed by the body. Prior to the
179Morrison & Barnett, supra note 177, at 25.
180John C. Villforth, The X Raying of America, FDA Consumer, Dec. 1979 – Jan. 1980, at 13.
181Id.
182Id. at 15 – 16.
183X’ing Out Unneeded X Rays, FDA Consumer, Apr. 1981, at 19.
184Id.
39Bureau’s involvement, radiation exposure from mammography varied widely among hospitals and clinics.
Improper techniques and equipment further exacerbated the already high levels of radiation produced by
mammography.185 With FDA support, better x-ray ﬁlms and intensifying screens were developed that
provided “a sharper, clearer, more deﬁned image on the ﬁlm at a much lower dose of x rays to the patient than
previously had been possible.”186 While such technology would have been developed eventually, Villforth
believed the widespread concern from physicians and consumers about the dangers of unnecessary radiation
dose in mammography accelerated the process.187
The progress of x-ray radiation control is remarkable. While many in Congress were disappointed that
the FDA had not pushed for more authority to regulate x-ray use,188 the concerns that arose during the
legislative hearings were successfully addressed because the FDA developed a broad radiation control program
that encompassed not just enforcement of the RCHSA but also a public education program. Some patients
may still demand unnecessary procedures, but the vast majority of the public and the medical profession
recognize the inherent dangers of excess radiation exposure. The combination of widespread education and
better technology has produced a society much less likely to be exposed to excessive x-ray radiation.
B. Microwave Ovens: Space-Age Cooking Devices
Microwaves were experiencing a signiﬁcant increase in popularity at the same time the RCHSA was being
passed. While Dr. Russell Morgan’s statement about the lack of evidence of biological eﬀects from mi-
crowaves may have been technically correct,189 the FDA believed the absence of proof did not indicate that
microwaves were actually safe. The FDA’s research indicated that many microwaves were leaking radiation
185See Annabel Hecht, Using X Rays To Detect Breast Cancer, FDA Consumer, Apr. 1976, at 14.
186Villforth, supra note 180, at 15.
187Id.
188See supra note 70.
189See supra note 43.
40above the voluntary industry recommendation.190 The ﬁrst microwave oven standard went into eﬀect on
October 6, 1971, and was set well below the lowest level known to cause biological eﬀects.191 That did not
satisfy Consumer Reports, however, which found “‘measurable radiation leakage’ in 15 leading models and
warned the public not to purchase those ovens.”192 Dr. Milton Zaret testiﬁed before Congress that several
years of such exposure could lead to the development of cataracts.193 Consumer Reports claimed that no
amount of leakage could be considered acceptable.194
The FDA and the Association for Home Appliance Manufacturers disputed that assessment. The FDA in-
dicated that common consumer goods such as shavers, food mixers, vacuum cleaners, and other appliances
with electric motors would have to be banned under a zero-radiation policy.195 The FDA also criticized
Consumer Reports’ erroneous interpretation of the FDA’s policy for causing unnecessary concern among
the public. The FDA claimed Consumer Reports inappropriately compared the FDA’s microwave emissions
standards to the Soviet Union’s microwave exposure standards in concluding that the Soviet Union’s stan-
dards were 500 times lower than the American standard. The emission level at the source was very diﬀerent
from the actual exposure received.196 The Bureau assured the public that a properly manufactured and
operated microwave oven was safe for human use, and that the Bureau would continue to test microwaves
in homes, commercial establishments, and on dealer and distributor premises to ensure compliance with
190See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
191Robert T. De Vore & Albert Van De Griek, The Microwave Oven Safety Debate, FDA Consumer, Apr. 1973, at 25.
192FDA Actions: Microwave Ovens, 31 Cong. Q. 850 (1973).
193Id.
194De Vore & Van De Griek, supra note 191, at 25.
195Id.
196Id. The Soviet standard was for whole body exposure for a working day of eight hours or more. If a microwave emitted
radiation at the maximum allowed level, “one could stand within four feet of it for over eight hours per day or within 14 inches
for two hours a day without reaching Russian exposure limits.” Additionally, if a microwave leaked from multiple points, then
fewer points of the human body would be exposed to radiation, further reducing the danger to humans. Id. at 26. Consumer
Reports refused to acknowledge the inaccuracies in its April 1973 report and instead declared in August 1973: “Microwave
Ovens: Still Not Recommended.” Thomas V. DiBacco, Microwave’s Generation: America Begins Cooking to a Diﬀerent Beep,
Wash. Post, May 31, 1990, at T28.
41federal standards.197 The Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers asserted that all leakage cited in
the Consumer Reports article was “‘well within the limits’ set by the government.”198
The FDA continued to adjust its microwave standard to protect the public. The FDA proposed amendments
to its standards in 1973 to require ovens to shut oﬀ automatically if the safety interlocks that prevented the
ovens from operating when the door was open had failed. By October 3, 1975, manufacturers were required
to attach permanent labels warning users how to avoid exposure to excessive microwave energy.199 In issuing
the labeling requirement, the FDA assured the public that it reﬂected the FDA’s belief that a safe product
as manufactured could pose a risk to consumers if used or serviced improperly. The FDA emphasized that
there had been no documented cases of injuries associated with microwave ovens that complied with federal
standards. The FDA conﬁrmed, however, that extra precautions were necessary because of the uncertainties
about possible radiation eﬀects.200 The standards are now a mix of performance standards and warnings
through labels and instruction manuals for consumers and repair personnel.201
Despite fears of uncertainty, these “space-age” cooking devices became commonplace as prices dropped. The
ﬁrst models were priced at $1500. By 1968, the price had dropped but was still very high at $995. About
100,000 ovens were sold in 1971, when the ﬁrst standards were enacted. In April 1973, when Consumer
Reports warned consumers not to buy microwave ovens, sales were predicted to reach 800,000. By 1981,
forty-ﬁve companies were manufacturing microwaves. Two years later, one in every four American homes
197De Vore & Van De Griek, supra note 191, at 26. The Bureau also assured that it carefully monitored manufacturer quality
control and test procedures and would use its authority to withhold non-compliant microwave ovens from the market.
198FDA Actions: Microwave Ovens, supra note 192.
199Valerie A. Britain, Microwave Oven Labeling, FDA Consumer, July – Aug. 1975, at 16. The current labeling requirement
remains the same: “Precautions for safe use to avoid possible exposure to excessive microwave energy. DO NOT attempt to
operate this oven with: (a) object caught in door, (b) door that does not close properly, (c) damaged door, hinge, latch, or
sealing surface.” 21 C.F.R. § 1030.10(c)(6)(i) (2005).
200Britain, supra note 199, at 16. In particular, microwave radiation can cause heating within the body without activating
temperature sensors on the skin. While these sensors can warn users of dangers from gas or electric ovens, they may not always
function when exposed to microwave radiation.
201See 21 C.F.R. § 1030.10 (2005).
42owned a microwave, now priced at just $399. By 1990, seventy-ﬁve to eighty percent of American homes
had microwaves, which were now manufactured to ﬁt every individual’s needs.202 Currently, as many as
ninety-ﬁve percent of American homes owns a microwave.203
The generally accepted safety of microwave ovens changed the focus of the FDA’s concerns from radiation
emission to the contents of microwave-packaged foods, the materials used in the packaging, and the proper
techniques for microwave cooking. Microwave packaged food sales had risen from $53 million in 1983 to $3
billion in 1992. When packaging materials were ﬁrst regulated as passive or active indirect food additives,
the FDA did not consider the possible eﬀects high temperature could have on the migration of components of
the packaging material. In 1987, FDA scientists noticed that the heat-susceptor204 portions of microwavable
popcorn bags would burn through. Further investigation indicated that the heat-susceptors helped, rather
than prevented, the migration of components into foods. The FDA was unsure of the health eﬀects of such
migrations but used the opportunity to urge safe use of microwaves. While the FDA repeated safety mea-
sures outlined in instruction manuals, the U.S. Department of Agriculture issued its instructions on proper
microwave cooking of meats.205 The current trend in FDA regulation of microwaves is a signiﬁcant advance
from the days when people thought microwave cooking made the food radioactive.
C. Sunlamps and Sunbathing: There Is No Such Thing as a Safe Tan
The FDA also expended great eﬀort in public education concerning sunlight and sun tanning. While scien-
tists in the 1970’s agreed that the sun was the leading cause of skin cancer, the public was not so informed.
202Di Bacco, supra note 196, at T28. Note, however, that many still questioned the safety of microwave ovens. Joanne Barron
of CDRH stated that the department still received two to twenty complaints of radiation leakage each year. Most turned out to
be false alarms. The real problems were often due “to abuse of the oven or improper servicing.” Dixie Farley, Keeping Up with
the Microwave Revolution, FDA Consumer, Mar. 1990, at 17, 18. See also Jane Clarke, Radiate a Little Goodness, Times
London, Features, Apr. 19, 2005 (noting that a major objection to microwave ovens is a safety concern regarding the use of
radiation to heat food).
203Cornell Researchers Explanation Why Some Microwaved Foods Explode Could Revolutionize Microwave Cooking and Ster-
ilization, Cornell News, June 23, 1998, at www.news.cornell.edu/releases/June98/microwave.ift.ssl.html (last visited Apr. 29,
2006).
204“[H]eat-susceptor packaging is usually metalized polyethylene terephthalate (PET) ﬁlm laminated to paperboard with
adhesive. This metalized ﬁlm absorbs the microwave energy in the oven and, with most of the microwaves absorbed, the
package becomes a little ‘frying pan’ that actively participates in the cooking.” Dixie Farley, supra note 202, at 19.
205Id. at 20.
43Sunbathing and the use of sunlamps were rather common, with little notice paid to the estimated 6,500
to 7,500 deaths in the United States annually from skin cancer.206 The FDA sought to educate the public
about the dangers of ultraviolet radiation, particularly because it was believed that a ninety-eight to one
hundred percent cure rate was possible with consumer awareness and early detection.207
The concerns about ultraviolet radiation were similar to the concerns about microwave radiation: both are
invisible and cannot be felt at the time of exposure. Biological eﬀects appear later and may include eye
injury, sunburn, skin eruptions, premature aging of the skin, and skin cancer. The short wavelengths of
ultraviolet radiation emitted by some sunlamps were believed to be highly dangerous to cell structure.208
Repeated exposure to ultraviolet radiation, even when a person never burns, was believed to be damaging in
the long run. While people under twenty rarely develop skin cancer, the rate of skin cancer increases until
about the age of seventy ﬁve. Dermatologists strongly advised against excessive sunbathing, believing that
many sunbathers relied on inaccurate assumptions to justify their actions.209 The use of sunlamps further
increased the potential for damage.
The FDA published its ﬁrst proposed standards for sunlamps on December 30, 1977.210 Sunlamps were
being used primarily for tanning, though they were also used to treat acne and other skin problems. At
the time the standards were ﬁrst proposed, thousands were treated annually for injuries from sunlamps,
which typically occurred when users failed to follow instructions. Many fell asleep under the lamps, failed
to use timers or goggles, or tried exposures that were too long. The proposed regulations would require
sunlamps to have timers that shut the lamp oﬀ automatically after ten minutes or less. Sunlamp bulbs
206Robert T. De Vore, Sunbathing and Skin Cancer, FDA Consumer, May 1977, at 15.
207When the FDA began promoting public awareness, ninety-ﬁve percent of skin cancer patients were fully cured. Skin cancer
diﬀers from other cancers because “it can be seen [and] can almost always be detected and treated in an early stage.” Id.
208Id. at 16. The FDA noted that the ozone layer ﬁltered most of the dangerous short wavelengths from the sun, but the
severe ozone depletion since the 1970’s has renewed concerns about such exposure.
209The FDA cited two common justiﬁcations. First, the sun stimulates vitamin D production. Experts countered that a
proper diet provided suﬃcient vitamin D. Second, sunscreen lotions allowed tanning without burning, and therefore was safe for
the skin. The experts countered that a “tanned skin is a damaged skin.” Even in the absence of burning, ultraviolet radiation
can damage DNA. Id.
210Sunlamps: Putting Safety First, FDA Consumer, Mar. 1978, at 16, 19.
44that ﬁt into conventional sockets would not be allowed to ensure that they could only be used with timers.
Sunlamps would not be allowed to emit excessive short wavelengths of radiation. Protective eyewear would
be required. Finally, better warning labels and instructions would be required.211 The FDA also suggested
safety precautions for those who insisted on using sunlamps.212 The ﬁrst sunlamp standards went into eﬀect
on May 7, 1980.213
As the FDA was researching the dangers of sunlamps, tanning booths and huts in salons began to grow in
popularity, particularly in sunny states where bronzed skin was equated with wealth.214 The new tanning
booths were using ninety-ﬁve percent UV-A radiation and only ﬁve percent UV-B radiation, leading to claims
that tanning booths were a safer alternative.215 While UV-B radiation was believed to be the cancer-causing
radiation, the FDA did not support the safety claim. At the time, UV-A radiation was known to penetrate
deeper into the skin and was believed to cause aging and skin sagging, but no direct connection to cancer
had been established. The FDA was certain, however, that some chemicals increased sensitivity to UV-A ra-
diation and could cause damage. The FDA also rejected the claim that goggles were not needed. Both types
of radiation could cause eye burning and other corneal irritations and could increase the risk of cataracts.
Additionally, the amount of light provided by the booths was as high as “10 times the irradiance of noon
summer sunlight.” In other words, there was enough radiation to serve as a “successful experimental tool
for generating skin cancer in animals.”216
By 1987, the FDA believed the ﬁrst generation to understand the risks of too much sun had arrived. The
problem remained, however, that tanning was becoming more popular than ever. While only one in 1,500
211Id.
212These precautions included makeshift options that reﬂected the concerns addressed in the proposed standards, such as
using loud kitchen timers when a sunlamp does not have an automatic one and using some form of eye protection. Practical
precautions included not using sunlamps if a person has fair skin and only using sunlamps as recommended in the instructions.
A surprising precaution was not to use sunlamps after a shower or sauna because natural oils that can absorb some of the
ultraviolet rays have been washed oﬀ. Id.
213The current standards are at 21 C.F.R. § 1040.20 (2005).
214Harold Hopkins, Tan Now, Pay Later?, FDA Consumer, Apr. 1982, at 9, 11.
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45persons in the United States was expected to develop melanoma in 1930, the expected rate in 1980 was
one in 250. Scientists estimated that it could rise as high as one in 100. The FDA also determined that
the assertion that UV-A tanning booths were safer than UV-B sunlamps was wrong.217 UV-B radiation
was originally believed to be more dangerous because it burned the skin faster, but research indicated that
the eﬀects of UV-A radiation were just as harmful. The eﬀects of UV-A radiation were merely delayed
because the radiation penetrated deeper into the skin.218 Following its duty to protect the public, the FDA
prohibited manufacturers and sunlamp operators from making such health claims as “improves immunity”
and “treats disease.” “No harmful rays” and “no harmful eﬀects” were also prohibited. The FDA used its
seizure and enforcement authority to intercept imported sunlamps because they lacked required safety fea-
tures. The FDA also seized installed equipment and shut down salons for unsafe equipment and operation.
State and local governments developed their own regulations requiring tanning salons to properly inform and
protect customers.219 The 1978 requirement of the “sun protection factor” (“SPF”) indicating the degree of
protection a sun-blocking agent supplied had led to a growth in the sun products industry, suggesting some
success.220
Yet despite the FDA’s eﬀorts at public education and the availability of sunscreens, skin cancer rates con-
tinued to grow. A University of Florida study found that ninety percent of those surveyed knew the basic
harms of sunlight and understood the SPF system. However, only half used sunscreen regularly, and most
still insisted that a “tan is healthy.”221 The FDA began to publish regularly its recommendations against
sunlamps and tanning booths and its suggestions for protecting against sun exposure.222
217Richard C. Thompson, Out of the Bronzed Age, FDA Consumer, June 1987, at 21, 22.
218Scientists debate whether UV-A radiation is actually more harmful because it damages the dermis – “the inner layer of
skin that contains the blood vessels, hair follicles, and nerve endings.” Alexandra Greeley, No Safe Tan, FDA Consumer, May
1991, at 16, 19.
219Thompson, supra note 217, at 22.
220The cosmetics industry quickly picked up on the SPF trend and began applying these numbers to their products. Id. at
23.
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46The trend in recent years has been the use of sunless spray tans. Some credit designer Coco Chanel with
starting the tanning craze by returning from her yachting vacation with a tan. Tanned skin was soon equated
with great wealth, leisure time, social status, and high fashion, a complete departure from the previous as-
sociation of tanned skin with outdoor laborers.223 When celebrities began turning to sunless tans as a safer
and easier alternative, the public followed. Many salons now oﬀer spray tans that look a bit unnatural but
are much safer.
Sunless spray tans contain the color additive dihydroxyacetone (“DHA”), which interacts with skin cells to
darken the skin color. The FDA approved DHA for use in tanners in 1977, though it was used at that time
only in over-the-counter lotions and creams. Doctors now encourage teenagers to use self-tanners as opposed
to sunbathing or sunlamps.224 Excessive sunbathing remains a problem, however. While sunless tanning
is growing in popularity, it also indicates that Americans still associate tanned skin with good health and
wealth. The federal standards ensure that tanning booths are as safe as possible, but the FDA’s eﬀorts in
changing people’s mindsets have yet to succeed.
D. Lasers: Disco Fun and Medical Wonder
Lasers are composed of concentrated beams of visible light, which distinguishes them from other forms of
radiation like microwaves and ultraviolet light that can cause cancer and genetic damage. The high con-
centration, or coherence, of the light waves in laser beams makes them potentially dangerous despite the
absence of cancer causing properties.225 The nature of lasers allowed them to be used in a wide variety of
areas in the early years of the RCHSA. Lasers had been used as highly accurate surveying tools; as tools
to perform delicate surgical procedures of the eye and throat; as supermarket checkout scanners; and as
Tanning Hazards, FDA Consumer, Mar. – Apr. 2005, at 8. Carolyn J. Strange, Thwarting Skin Cancer With Sun Sense,
FDA Consumer, July – Aug. 1995, at 10.
223See Greeley, supra note 218, at 17.
224Rados, supra note 222, at 9.
225Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Laser Light Show Safety: Who’s Responsible? 5, 7 (rev. ed.
1986), available at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/radhlth/pdf/llsgde01.pdf [hereinafter “CDRH, Laser Light Safety”].
47tools for drilling, cutting, and welding materials. Other popular uses included “communications, ﬁngerprint
identiﬁcation, pollution detection, cell measurement, [and] tailoring.”226
The ﬁrst laser standard went into eﬀect on August 1, 1976. Lasers were classiﬁed into four categories de-
pending on their ability to injure people and the intensity of the radiation from the beam. Class I lasers
are known to have no biological eﬀects. Class II lasers can produce eye damage from long, direct exposure.
Class III lasers can injure tissues after short, direct exposure. Class IV lasers can cause injury from reﬂected
light and after the beam has scattered.227 Lasers used for demonstration purposes were generally in Class I
or Class II, but the growing popularity of laser light shows, which require Class III or even Class IV lasers
to be eﬀective, concerned the FDA.
The ﬁrst laser light show was introduced in Los Angeles in 1973 and was immediately successful. Just ﬁve
years later, laser light shows became popular in planetariums in at least twenty cities in the United States,
Canada, Britain, and Japan. Additionally, rock bands and discotheques began using laser light shows to
entertain patrons.228 While lasers at planetariums posed little threat to patrons, reports of uncontrolled or
unsafe use by rock bands were common. One performer directly sprayed the audience with laser beams from
a device on his wrist. Another show involved beams bounced from mirrored walls and mirrored balls. One
report stated that a rock band’s laser was so powerful that a stagehand used it to light a cigarette.229 The
FDA repudiated the belief that quick moving lasers were safe. Rather, lasers can strike a shiny surface at any
time and reﬂect into the eyes of patrons, causing serious vision impairment. The shows were being designed
by people who had little knowledge of the dangers of lasers, and the shows were virtually unregulated. The
FDA began an investigation into who the producers of the shows and the manufacturers of the equipment
were, and into what the speciﬁc hazards were. The FDA interpreted “manufacturer” to include persons who
226Annabel Hecht, Entertainment Lasers: Approach With Care, FDA Consumer, Sep. 1978, at 20, 22.
22721 C.F.R. 1040.10(b) (2005).
228Hecht, supra note 226, at 20.
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48receive compensation from laser light shows, who sell services as an assembler of such shows, or who create
the show and perform in the show. Laser light shows were technically required to seek variances, though
guidelines established situations in which variances were unnecessary.230 The FDA required variances for
Class III-b and Class IV lasers beginning in 1985.231 To provide substance to the guidelines, the FDA does
inspect shows when possible.232
The guidelines also regulate outdoor laser shows that may aﬀect airline pilots. The FDA originally believed
the chance of harm was very low,233 but by 1993, that view had changed. High-powered outdoor laser light
shows had become extremely popular in Las Vegas as a means of attracting tourists. Late that year, a pilot
was treated for corneal irritation after laser lights interfered with his vision on take-oﬀ. By late 1995, the
FAA reported to the FDA a total of ﬁfty-two incidents of aircraft illuminations from laser light shows, eleven
of which resulted in temporary blindness of the ﬂight crew members, and twenty four of which took place
during critical ﬂight times. The temporary blinding of an airline pilot on October 30, 1995, was so severe
that his captain had to take control until the pilot regained his eyesight. Investigations revealed numerous
violations of FDA standards, including operating without a variance, failing to employ spotters to warn of
incoming and outgoing planes, failing to maintain documented quality control procedures, and failing to pro-
vide certiﬁcates of proper operator training. In December 1995, the FDA declared a temporary moratorium
on laser light shows in Las Vegas.234 In July 1999, the FDA completed a memorandum of understanding
with the FAA to coordinate their programs and research on laser light displays.235
230Hecht, supra note 226, at 24. The guidelines required that the radiation exposure to the audience be no greater than a
Class I laser. Lasers must be operated at least three meters above where the audience may stand. Equipment was required to
have a shut oﬀ mechanism. Notiﬁcation to the FDA was required. The FDA retained the right to inspect the shows and to
impose civil ﬁnes up to $300,000. A detailed explanation of the guidelines can be found in CDRH, Laser Light Safety, supra
note 225, at 17 – 20.
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49The predominant use of lasers remains in the medical ﬁeld. The FDA’s authority to regulate medical uses
of lasers comes under both the RCHSA and the Medical Devices Amendments. Lasers provide beneﬁts in
medicine that traditional tools cannot. Lasers have the potential to vaporize or mend tissue with minimal
scarring.236 They can cut through tissue with minimal bleeding because they actually help coagulate the
tissue. They reach parts of the body that a doctor with a scalpel cannot reach. Selection of wavelengths
allows doctors to target speciﬁc tissues without aﬀecting others.237 Technology has since allowed lasers to
be used for a variety of other purposes. The FDA has approved the use of lasers by dentists for soft tissue
surgery, an option favored by many patients because recovery is less painful.238 A laser to treat tooth decay
has also been approved.239 Laser eye surgery can correct myopia, hyperopia, and astigmatism with minimal
pain and minimal recovery time.240 Cosmetic uses include skin resurfacing, a controlled burning of the skin
to remove wrinkles, lines, scars, and superﬁcial growths,241 and hair removal.242
The increasing popularity of lasers among consumers has added to the FDA’s concerns, particularly for
children. The decreasing price of lasers allowed for their greater use by teachers and lecturers, but the FDA
feared the promotion of lasers as toys.243 The Laser Institute of America reported that some mothers bought
lasers for their children to simulate Star Wars characters.244 The availability of lasers on the internet further
exacerbated the situation. High-powered green lasers were being modiﬁed to emit radiation far in excess
of the FDA’s standards and were being used for such activities as aiming at airplanes in ﬂight. The FDA
236Williams, supra note 232, at 32.
237Alexandra Greeley, Cosmetic Laser Surgery: A High-Tech Weapon in the Fight Against Aging Skin, FDA Consumer, May
– June 2000, at 34, 36.
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50issued a warning to consumers that lasers purchased over the internet might not comply with federal safety
regulations and that illegal lasers from outside the United States could be denied entry.245 Unlike other
devices regulated by the FDA, lasers are dangerous for contradictory reasons: people are either unaware of
the dangers, or they are aware and exploit their knowledge. In addition to educating the public about the
true dangers of lasers, the FDA must seek to control their availability.
E. Cell Phones: Renewed Radiation Concerns
The proliferation of cellular telephones and other wireless electronic devices has renewed concerns about
dangerous radiation emissions. Similar to the concerns about microwave ovens, the public was aware that
some form of radiation was emitting from cell phones but was unsure of just how dangerous the radiation
was. Cell phones emit radiation in the form of non-ionizing radiofrequency (“RF”) energy, the same type of
energy used in microwave ovens. RF energy can be harmful at high levels because it can heat living tissue
and cause biological damage. RF energy from cell phones comes mainly from the antenna and dissipates
quickly with distance. Many experts believe that the six tenths of a watt of power emitted from cell phones
cannot possibly aﬀect human health. “[F]rom the physics standpoint, biological eﬀects from mobile phones
are ‘somewhere between impossible and implausible.”’246 Extensive research has been conducted to verify
this assumption and in response to lawsuits and general public concerns.
The FDA has collaborated with the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) in its research and public
education program.247 The results of studies have been conﬂicting. Proving a cause-and-eﬀect relationship
in epidemiological studies is diﬃcult because of the many variables involved in a person’s life. Brain cancers
245U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Important Information to Consumers on Internet Sales of Laser Products, at
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/comp/internetlasers.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
246Tamar Nordenberg, Cell Phones & Brain Cancer: No Clear Connection, FDA Consumer, Nov. – Dec. 2000, at 19, 19 –
21.
247The Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration also have a regula-
tory duty regarding cellular telephones. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Wireless Phones: Additional Information, at
http://www.fda.gov/cellphones/additional.html#1 (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
51can also take years or even decades to develop, while lifestyle factors such as the position in which a person
holds the phone create additional diﬃculties. Animal studies are easy to control, but correlating animal-
testing results to human health eﬀects is diﬃcult. In addition, researchers in animal studies tend to use
animals genetically altered to be predisposed to cancer and expose the animals to much more radiation than
is consistent with normal cell phone use.248 The FDA admits that some test results may warrant further
investigation,249 but no studies have demonstrated a clear connection between cell phone radiation exposure
and biological health eﬀects.250 A concern exists, however, because the studies averaged three years of phone
use and therefore cannot make credible predictions of long-term eﬀects.251
Cell phone regulations and standards are set by the FCC.252 After the passage of the National Environmental
Policy Act, the agency adopted guidelines for electromagnetic radiation emissions.253 As an agency without
expertise on health and safety matters, the FCC relied on standards promulgated by the American National
Standards Institute (“ANSI”), an organization also consulted by the FDA in setting its standards. The ﬁnal
standards, however, were established based on consultations with the FDA regarding the FDA’s obligations
under the RCHSA. The FDA advised the FCC to decline ANSI’s recommendation to exempt wireless phones
and other low-power devices from federal RF standards, and the FCC deferred to the FDA’s expertise. This
resulted in the FDA’s characterization of the RF requirements as “a signiﬁcant step towards achieving a
248Nordenberg, supra note 246, at 21. Scientists note the diﬃculty of correlating nearly continuous, whole body RF exposure
of rats predisposed to develop cancer with the much briefer, head-only radiation typical of normal human cell phone use.
249In one study, tumor patients reported that the tumor developed on the side they tend to hold their cell phones, but
researchers believed the recollections were biased by knowledge of which side the tumor was on. A diﬀerent study found no
association between cell phone use and a type of brain cancer called glioma. However, there appeared to be an increase in one
rare type of glioma. Researchers believed this was due to chance because the risk tended to decrease with greater cell phone use.
A cognitive function test in which participants were exposed to simulated phone signals indicated no impairment in cognitive
skills. People exposed to the signals actually responded more quickly in one of the tests. Id. at 23.
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accompanying text; infra note 271.
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52consensus guideline on RF exposure which will have the support of the federal agencies responsible for
protecting the public from nonionizing radiation injury.”254
The FDA’s and FCC’s assertions regarding the safety of cell phones have not stopped the proliferation of law
suits, however. In 2000 neurosurgeon Chris Newman ﬁled an $800 million lawsuit against Motorola alleging
his brain tumor was caused by nine years of cell phone use. Motorola’s response echoed the assertions of the
FDA:
Since 1992, we have seen this same issue raised in a limited number of other cases. One
by one, these have been dismissed by the courts or withdrawn by the plaintiﬀs. This trend
reﬂects a fundamental reality: the claim of a link between wireless phone use and adverse
health eﬀects is groundless and unsupported by a substantial amount of scientiﬁc knowledge
accumulated from decades of research related to the possible health eﬀects of radio waves.255
Newman stirred public concerns about cell phone safety, but his claim eventually failed.256 The district court
rejected his expert witnesses for failing to meet the requirements for reliability under Daubert v. Merrell
Dow.257 The court cited the vast array of studies published in peer-reviewed journals that all found no
reliable link between cell phones and brain tumors.258 Newman’s expert witnesses, on the other hand,
relied on “reasoning, theories, and methodology [that] have not gained general acceptance in the scientiﬁc
community.”259 While Motorola presented established and highly-credentialed experts, Newman presented
witnesses who appeared to manipulate the results of their own research to provide the desired result. No
one had replicated or validated their studies, while most outright rejected them. Other expert witnesses
proﬀered by Newman were deemed irrelevant.260
The result was hardly unexpected. A Florida district court had rejected a wrongful death case against a
254In re Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 486.
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53cell phone company for the same reason ﬁve years before Newman ﬁled his suit.261 The plaintiﬀ alleged his
wife had died of a brain tumor either caused or accelerated by the use of a cell phone. The plaintiﬀ’s expert
witnesses had misrepresented the conclusions of the studies on which they had relied. Summary judgment
was granted for the defendants for lack of evidence.262
A district court acknowledged the importance of the RCHSA in Schiﬀner v. Motorola, Inc., when it rejected
the plaintiﬀ’s argument on federal preemption grounds.263 The plaintiﬀs’ causes of action included failure
to warn consumers of risks associated with cell phone use and false pronouncements of proven safety. The
court held that the RCHSA preempted state regulations despite the fact that the FDA was not aﬃrmatively
regulating cell phones. Allowing states or courts to set standards would usurp power granted to the FDA by
Congress under the RCHSA and could create conﬂicts between federal and state standards.264 This holding
has been called into question by Pinney v. Nokia, Inc.265 The Fourth Circuit held that a well-pleaded
complaint could avoid the substantial federal question doctrine.266 The court stated that FCC standards
were merely evidence to be considered in determining if a product was defectively designed; a ruling for
either side would not question the FCC’s decisions. The dissenting judge stated that “the case cannot
be resolved without proving that the FCC’s RF radiation emission standards are too high to protect the
consuming public.”267 Rejecting the majority’s assertion that all claims could be proven without reference to
the FCC’s standards, Judge Kiser characterized the case as a “thinly-disguised attack on the validity of the
FCC standards [that] raises a substantial federal question.”268 While federal preemption was not a proper
aﬃrmative defense to raise in the removal hearing, the majority did reject a similar argument couched as a
261See Reynard v. NEC Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1500 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
262Id. at 1508.
263Schiﬀner v. Motorola, 697 N.E.2d 868, 870 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1998).
264Id. at 873.
265402 F.3d 430 (4th Cir. 2005).
266Id. at 446 – 47.
267Id. at 459 (Kiser, J., dissenting).
268Id.
54federal question issue.269
For the most part, however, cell phone law suits eventually fail, primarily due to the lack of scientiﬁc evidence
establishing a link between cell phone use and brain cancer. While other mass tort claims have succeeded
despite the lack of evidence, cell phone suits have not. It has been suggested that the absence of any evidence
of a cover up of by the cell phone industry of alleged fault may account for the diﬀerence.270 While research
thus far has failed to ﬁnd a link, the research continues, particularly concerning the long-term eﬀects of cell
phone use.271
V. The Accomplishments of the RCHSA
The Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act has been exceedingly successful in remedying the concerns
addressed during the 1967 and 1968 congressional hearings. During the hearings, witnesses consistently
pointed to a lack of research and general knowledge of radiation risks as a driving force behind the failure
to protect the public. The absence of federal authority to regulate was of course a problem, but Congress
admitted upon passage of the act that more research was needed before enforceable standards could be set.
269Id. at 448. The court did consider the question of complete federal preemption, in which Congress “so completely preempt[s]
a particular area that any civil complaint raising th[e] select group of claims is necessarily federal in character.” The court held
that the FCA did not establish the exclusive claim for alleging cell phone injuries. Id. at 449, quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 – 64 (1987).
270Benjamin J. Wolf, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Cellular Phones and Mass Tort Litigation After Newman v. Motorola,
Inc., 14 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 267, 272 – 73 (2003).
271In April 2006, Dr. Lennart Hardell, the expert witness discredited by the court in Newman v. Motorola, released a study
ﬁnding a correlation between cell phone use and increased risk of brain cancer. His study was reported by major news outlets
and is raising concerns similar to those raised during Dr. Newman’s suit. The FDA stated that it planned to convene a meeting
to evaluate the study, but its initial review of the study revealed many defects that have led to past rejections of Hardell’s
research. In particular, the research relied on mailed questionnaires and a few follow-up interviews conducted by telephone.
Hardell failed to make statistical adjustments for all confounding factors other than time of diagnosis. He also lacked an
established mechanism of action and supporting animal studies. The FDA again noted that Hardell’s study was contrary to
other published studies of long-term cell phone use and brain cancer. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Use of Wireless
Communications Devices and the Risk of Brain Cancer, at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/wireless/braincancer040606.html (last
visited Apr. 6, 2006).
55The FDA currently has standards for 12 categories of electronic products, and manufacturers for the most
part comply with these standards. The act also resulted in increased public awareness and a strong public
education program that helped drive a change in behavior, so much so that other countries cite the act as the
model to follow in protecting their citizens from radiation.272 This section discusses the accomplishments of
the act but in doing so also acknowledges areas where results have not been quite as successful.
A. Research and Standard Setting
A physician who testiﬁed during the congressional hearings urged that the RCHSA be limited to only ionizing
radiation, as that was the only type of radiation known to cause biological damage. That statement was
questionable at the time and has since been soundly rejected. In addition, the dangers of long-term or low-
dose ionizing radiation exposure, a little explored area in the 1960’s, are now much more established. The
FDA’s radiation research program, ﬁrst through the Bureau of Radiological Health and now through the
Center for Devices and Radiological Health, in conjunction with other federal safety statutes and regulatory
agencies, has supported extensive research and contributed greatly to scientiﬁc knowledge. The commitment
to research has allowed standards to be set at levels that the FDA can say is truly protective of human
health. Before enactment of the RCHSA, electronic products were regulated loosely by the states and
by voluntary standards from professional groups. The absence of federal enforceable standards required
consumers to rely on companies’ self-policing. As evidenced by the GE television recall, self-policing does
work because companies are concerned about their reputations. However, the lack of enforceable standards
at the manufacturing and market entry stages led to excessive radiation exposure for consumers. In addition
to serving a preventative function, enforceable standards were able to serve as a technology-forcing device.
Innovation occurs over time, and televisions unquestionably would have become safer in the absence of federal
standards. While rogue players will always exist,273 most manufacturers will design safe consumer devices, if
272See Vanguard, Consumer Protection: The Right of Every Nigerian, Africa News, Jan. 14, 2004 (stating that Nigeria
should follow the FDA’s lead and protect its citizens by regulating radiation-emitting products, particularly cell phones).
273See, e.g., the X-Ray of Greenville case, discussed supra Part IV(A).
56not to protect consumers, then at least to protect their reputations. When the safety measures are relatively
low-cost and can be passed to consumers, manufacturers have little incentive to produce a slightly cheaper
but dangerous product, particularly when their competitors are producing safe products. Hard deadlines
quicken this process. The GE television recall occurred in 1967. The public awareness of radiation emissions
from televisions persuaded the government to recommend that viewers sit at least six feet from their sets.
By 1971, when the ﬁnal phase of the ﬁrst television standard was enacted, the government believed it was
safe to watch television from any distance.274 Limiting emissions proved to be quite easy and cheap.275
Consequently, violations of the emissions limits are uncommon. The 1974 Matsushita television recall was
based on possible radiation emissions should part of the circuit board fail. While the FDA rejected its
defense, Matsushita claimed that no similar failure had ever occurred, nor was one likely to occur.276 The
1991 Goldstar violations were due to poor testing procedures. Everyone agreed that no Goldstar televisions
had ever been found to emit excess radiation.277
In addition to standards setting, the RCHSA required the FDA to support research. This included both the
dangers of radiation exposure and the innovations needed to reduce radiation. Research under the RCHSA
has alerted the scientiﬁc community and the public to the dangers of microwave radiation, ultraviolet light
from the sun, and laser lights directed towards the eyes, all non-ionizing forms of radiation previously thought
to have negligible harms. However, research has also contributed to the development of safer products, the
primary goal of the RCHSA. The Bureau of Radiological Health quickly developed devices to study the eﬀects
of the radiation, but it also designed cheap and eﬀective tools to be used in the ﬁeld to detect radiation
emission.278 The Bureau’s research also directly improved the safety of radiation emitting products. One
274De Vore, supra note 6, at 9.
275“[S]pecial voltage hold-down circuits were put into use in all color sets, causing them to fail rather than exceed [the] speciﬁed
level; picture tube shielding was improved, and, coincidentally, sets went solid state, removing [the] power tube as a possible
radiation source.” Goldstar Rocked by Obsolete X-Ray Rule, supra note 130.
276Gundaker, supra note 117, at 11.
277Goldstar Rocked by Obsolete X-Ray Rule, supra note 130.
278De Vore, supra note 6, at 7. The meter to check microwave ovens for radiation leakage was designed using parts readily
57example is the automatic collimator.279 Unlike the detection devices and the television modiﬁcations, the
collimator was comparatively expensive to install.280 However, its ability to reduce excess radiation exposure
in the source that provided ninety percent of Americans’ overall exposure led to its inclusion in the x-ray
standards.281 While manufacturers’ lobbying eﬀorts succeeded in weakening the bill in 1968, consumer safety,
not cost-beneﬁt analysis, remains the primary goal of the RCHSA.
Enforcement actions for violations of RCHSA standards are rare. While this is certainly due to the traditional
cooperation between the FDA and the manufacturers, it must also be related to the fact that violations are
not common. Certainly some violations go undetected, but the cost of compliance, particularly after the
technology has been developed by manufacturers and by the FDA, is low compared to the cost of being
found in violation. Both the Matsushita and Goldstar violations were detected during routine inspections.
For Goldstar, the money saved by lax recordkeeping and improper on-site testing resulted in the loss of
tens of millions of dollars in sales when its products were kept oﬀ the market during the peak sales season.
Goldstar was also required to implement a Corrective Action Plan, which required it to redesign its quality
control program and retest samples of its stock.282 The imposition of civil ﬁnes on companies and on
individuals for violations by the company further reduces any ﬁnancial gain a company may seek. The
FDA’s trend towards combining enforcement under the RCHSA with other safety acts adds the possibility of
criminal prosecution. These penalties assume companies care only about the bottom line and leave out the
possibility that manufacturers also recognize the dangers of radiation and understand their duty to produce
safe products. Whatever the reasons, the combination of extensive research and standards enforceable
available to oven servicemen. The Bureau’s device cost $150, while commercial microwave measuring instruments at the
time cost $800. A similar x-ray detection instrument was designed as an “easy-to-use” and inexpensive device for television
servicemen for use on home receivers.
279De Vore, supra note 166, at 5 – 6.
280In the X-Ray of Greenville case, Wilder saved $2500 by foregoing the use of automatic collimators in favor of manual
collimators, a decision that was both in violation of the standards and potentially dangerous. See Hommel & Thompson, supra
note 171.
28121 C.F.R. § 1020.30(h) (2005).
282Id.
58through inspections, forced recalls, and ﬁnes has resulted in much safer consumer products and has met the
goals Congress set for the RCHSA.
B. Education and Behavior
While public education is not technically required by the RCHSA, the FDA’s radiation control program has
always included an eﬀort to educate consumers and users to achieve the goals of the act. Public awareness
of the dangers of radiation emitting products is essential in reducing unnecessary exposure. CDRH has four
goals for its radiological health program:
(1) A public able to make informed choices about their own exposure to radiation-emitting
products in the medical, occupational and home setting;
(2) Users of radiation-emitting products able to minimize their own exposures and those of
people they expose;
(3) Manufacturers of radiation-emitting products able to understand their responsibilities
and sensitive to radiation risk issues; and
(4) FDA and State radiation control programs that actively encourage and assist users in
minimizing radiation exposure and risk.283
Public disclosure has the potential to lead to greater fears regarding previously unknown risks, but it can also
allay fears created by popular press or other unreliable sources. It can also change behavior. Behavior does
change in the absence of federal regulation, but change is often slower or, as in the case of the ﬂuoroscope, is
in response to a really bad practice. A ﬂuoroscope is “an x-ray device that provides images of internal body
parts as they move.”284 It requires high levels of radiation exposure, and often for longer periods of time, to
produce useable images. Fluoroscopes were common in doctors’ oﬃces during the 1950’s because they were
very eﬀective diagnostic tools. When they were ﬁrst developed, however, they were considered novelties that
drew in people’s attention and consequently were used for rather impractical reasons. Shoe stores used them
to see the bone structure in customers’ feet. Customers, particularly children, liked seeing the bones in their
feet move when they wiggled their toes, and shoe stores liked the increased business. The use was quickly
284Lewis, supra note 1, at 18.
59discontinued when scientists discovered the potential harm.285 The correct decision for human health was
made before anyone ever considered a radiation control bill.
A fairly bad practice that was remedied by the RCHSA was the excessive use of x-ray diagnoses. The
value of x-ray technology was never questioned, but as discussed in Part IV(A), the technology was being
used in unwarranted situations. Mass chest x-rays to detect tuberculosis286 or as part of routine government
physicals287 were common, as were pelvimetries of pregnant women in some parts of the country.288 Patients
often demanded x-ray examinations as further assurance of their good health, while doctors commonly
provided x-rays to establish evidence in the event of a malpractice suit.289 X-ray procedures expose patients
to radiation but are justiﬁed on the basis of their diagnostic value. When medical diagnoses can be made
eﬀectively without the use x-rays, the use of such procedures represents nothing more than unnecessary and
excessive radiation exposure. Informing the public that excessive x-ray exposure posed long-term risks was
not diﬃcult. However, the FDA was then faced with a public fearful of all x-ray examinations. The FDA
had to convey that properly prescribed x-ray examinations provided beneﬁts that far outweighed the risks,
and that no one x-ray examination would cause cancer.290
One method of reducing fears was to educate both patients and physicians regarding the measures that can
be taken to reduce potential risks. The scientiﬁc community generally recognized that radiation that posed
almost no risk to adults could have a much greater biological eﬀect on individual reproductive cells and on
developing fetuses. A mutation in a single sperm or egg cell later used in reproduction can cause genetic
285Id. at 18 – 19. Note, however, that some doctors continued to use ﬂuoroscopes despite awareness of the high radiation
emissions and potential risks. Technology to allow lower doses was not developed until the 1960’s, and it was not until the
1990’s that cameras and computers could enhance images to further reduce exposure. Even today, while the radiation doses
have decreased, the lengthy time of exposure for proper diagnosis remains a concern. Id. at 20. For an explanation of the
current state of ﬂuoroscope technology, see Paula Price, Equipment Safety and Risk Management, 75 Radiologic Tech. 197
(2004).
286See Britain, supra note 174, at 15.
287See X’ing Out Unneeded X Rays, supra note 183, at 19.
288See Smith, supra note 176, at 21.
289See De Vore, supra note 166, at 6.
290See id. at 5.
60defects that can pass for generations,291 while a single mutation in the cells of a fetus’ developing organs can
lead to birth defects.292 Both risks are unlikely, but simple measures such as using gonad shields to cover
male and female reproductive organs and informing doctors of possible pregnancies would further reduce the
already minimal risks. The FDA stressed that patients should ask their physicians why x-rays are necessary
and about protective measures that can be taken.293 Radiation exposure was further reduced by better
technology that allowed for safer x-rays, and by the development of other medical imaging devices that did
not use ionizing radiation.
Another interesting education program involves the dangers of sun tanning, discussed in Section IV(C). FDA
regulations have made sunlamps and tanning booths as safe as possible, and the public appears well aware
of the risks, but it continues to regard tanned skin as a sign of good health. The FDA maintains a webpage
entitled “The Darker Side of Tanning” that warns consumers of the dangers of UV-A and UV-B radiation.
294 Consumers’ behavior in this area appears quite irrational but might be explained by the fact that the
harms of UV radiation appear much later in life. Most skin cancers are also curable if detected early, which
may lead people to believe that skin cancer is not that dangerous. The FDA also had to contend with
manufacturer and tanning salon claims that tanning beds that used UV-A radiation were safer than natural
sunlight. While such claims are no longer allowed, their eﬀects remain.295 Self-tanners were often rejected
because they looked unnatural, but the proliferation of self-tanning by celebrities wanting a safe, year-round
tan has rejuvenated that market. The FDA’s challenge will be to convey to the public that pale skin is
healthy skin.
291James Morrison & Mark Barnett, Reducing Genetic Risk From X Rays, FDA Consumer, Feb. 1977, at 16, 17.
292Morrison & Barnett, supra note 177, at 24.
293Weck, supra note 2, at 27.
294Center for Devices and Radiological Health, The Darker Side of Tanning, at
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/consumer/tanning.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2006).
295Id.
61The area of perhaps greatest interest is the eﬀects of RF emissions from cell phones. As the number of
cell phone users grew, so did the concerns about new sources of radiation. In 2002, the FDA established
a website entitled “Cell Phone Facts” that explained RF emissions, federal regulatory standards, and the
current research demonstrating the safety of cell phone use.296 While all credible research has indicated that
cell phones emit too little radiation to cause biological harm, cell phone companies have continued to face
lawsuits regarding the alleged dangers of their devices. This is complicated by the lack of suﬃcient long-term
studies, a result of the relatively recent phenomenon of cell phone technology and regular cell phone use.
Additionally, the media has hampered the FDA and FCC’s eﬀorts at properly informing the public. The
media has jumped on the various lawsuits and created concern that has no basis in fact. After Dr. Newman’s
suit was ﬁled, Larry King had an “expert” on his show defending Newman’s claim and telling the public that
cell phones caused brain tumors.297 Newman’s suit was determined by the court and by well-established
scientists to be based on inconsistencies and questionable witnesses whose research techniques had been
rejected by the scientiﬁc community. The researcher rejected in Newman’s suit released a study in April
2006 that purports to prove that long-term cell phone use increases the risk of cancer. The FDA immediately
posted a notice to consumers on its cell phone website stating that it would evaluate Dr. Hardell’s conclusions
but also informing consumers of the ﬂaws it detected in Dr. Hardell’s methods. However, the story reached
the public not through the FDA’s considered statement on its website, but through the popular media that
reported Hardell’s conclusions without evaluating his methods. Consequently, cell phone risks are now a
renewed concern despite the vast amount of evidence indicating a lack of danger. This hardly means an end
to cell phone use, but it can lead to more law suits and potential plaintiﬀ success.
296U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Cell Phone Facts, at http://www.fda.gov/cellphones/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2006). See
also Federal Communications Commission, FDA-FCC Cellular Phone and Radiofrequency Energy Website Posted for Public
Use and Comment, 2002 WL 920836 (May 8, 2002).
297Nordenberg, supra note 246, at 19.
62The FDA’s education program historically relied on publications to communicate with manufacturers and
consumers, while health care professionals were provided with instructional courses. The internet now pro-
vides the easiest and most eﬀective tool to communicate the FDA’s research and policies. CDRH’s electronic
product radiation website provides the regulations for each electronic product regulated by the FDA, basic
information about each product, answers to frequently asked questions, forms for manufacturers, and up-
dates on research. The challenge will be to alert the public that this credible resource exists. Collaboration
with the popular media, perhaps by having the media refer the public to the FDA’s website for further
information on their stories, may provide the public with the most complete information and avoid repeats
of the Larry King cell phone misinformation.
VI. Conclusion
The Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act succeeded because the federal government was commit-
ted to understanding the eﬀects of radiation and protecting the public from it. The Bureau of Radiological
Health was dedicated to determining safe levels of radiation emissions and establishing enforceable standards
that reﬂected its research. Similarly, manufacturers understood the importance of working with the FDA
in establishing standards and developing techniques to meet the standards. Radiation-emitting electronic
products are now considered safe, which has shifted the FDA’s concerns from product design to misuse of
products by consumers. Over the years, however, the FDA has seen a reduction in federal funds earmarked
for radiation control activities.
In light of the diﬀerent circumstances in which CDRH ﬁnds itself, it has reconﬁgured the goals of the radia-
tion control program. Included in these goals are the acknowledgement of “the availability of national and
63international voluntary standards”; an awareness of radiation emitting products; the dissemination of useful
public health information to industry, users, the public, and regulators; and continued research to address
radiation risks.298 Speciﬁc changes are proposed for each of the ﬁve major program elements: standards,
monitoring, education, research, and program management. While CDRH will maintain its existing stan-
dards, it believes a move toward voluntary consensus standards for other products may be necessary, and
it is seeking “legislative changes to allow adoption and enforcement of voluntary consensus standards.”299
CDRH plans to change its monitoring program to devote resources to inspections of manufacturers rather
than product testing. It also plans on reducing the content of required reports from manufacturers.300 The
education program will rely on the World Wide Web to deliver user-friendly radiological health messages.
CDRH will also train “State and Federal personnel who can deliver critical radiological health messages to
users and the public.” Research will focus on high priority radiological health activities, as determined by
the Science Prioritization Oversight Committee. CDRH believes the success of its program requires “en-
dorsement and active participation by [the Oﬃce of Regulatory Aﬀairs] and the States.”301
The criticisms the FDA faced in the 1970’s have been resolved over the years. The RCHSA does not grant the
FDA authority to require pre-market approval of radiation-emitting products, so while the early standards
involved known dangerous products, the later standards arose as responses to problems. Since enactment
of the RCHSA, Congress has enacted several other consumer safety statutes that provide more extensive
authority to the FDA and other agencies. Consequently, dangerous products are generally prevented from
entering the market. As an agency with expertise, the FDA has administered the act as well as any other
agency could have. This is evidenced by the deference agencies such as the EPA and the FCC have granted
to the FDA in the setting of standards. While some may disagree with the allocation of funds within the
298CDRH, Adapting, supra note 74, at 5.
299Id. at 7.
300Extensive recordkeeping was considered necessary in the early years of the act in the event of a recall, but the general safety
of products today reduces the need to maintain this expensive practice.
301CDRH, Adapting, supra note 74, at 8 – 10.
64FDA, the fact remains that electronic products are now safe, scientists understand the biological harms of
all types of radiation, and consumers understand the general hazards of excess radiation.
All major devices that emit radiation are now regulated by the federal government, either through the
RCHSA or another federal act. When accidents happen, people become concerned that federal regulation
is insuﬃcient to protect the public.302 However, the radiation standards were set so far below the known
dangerous levels that variation from the standards may not actually endanger human health. Additionally,
the FDA has established a system that strongly encourages manufacturers to comply with the regulations and
to cooperate with the FDA in remedying violations. Though the FDA rarely resorts to adverse proceedings,
it retains that authority. The Senate certainly wanted a stronger bill in 1968, but the FDA’s achievements
under the compromised bill have suﬃciently addressed Congress’ concerns as it debated the bill. The budget
cuts may force the FDA to allocate its resources to what it considers more pressing matters, but that certainly
does not mean the RCHSA will cease to be important. While some companies will cut corners, it would
be illogical to think that these companies would completely abandon their obligations to the consuming
public and begin producing dangerous products. A more reasonable concern is that technology allows for
the rapid development of increasingly complicated and potentially hazardous electronic products, and the
FDA may not be ﬁnancially equipped to conduct research and establish new standards. Hopefully, the FDA
will discover the most appropriate manner in which to exploit the mass communications market to convey
its knowledge, policies, and concerns to manufacturers and to the general public.
302See Bennett & Dormer, supra note 4, at 310 (noting Senator John Glenn’s concerns following a case in which a radioactive
tip broke oﬀ a radiation therapy device and resulted in the death of the patient due to extreme radiation exposure).
65